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ABSTRACT
This thesis describes the development of a prototype security hardened field device (such 
as a remote terminal unit) based on commodity hardware and implementing a previously 
developed security architecture.  This security architecture has not been implemented in 
the  past  due  to  the  difficulty  of  providing  an  operating  system  which  meets  the 
architecture's  isolation  requirements.   Recent  developments  in  both  hardware  and 
software  have  made  such  an  operating  system  possible,  opening  the  door  to  the 
implementation and development of this  new security architecture in physical devices 
attached to supervisory control and data acquisition  (SCADA) systems.  A prototype is 
developed  using  commodity  hardware  selected  for  similarity  to  existing  industrial 
systems  and making  use  of  the  new  OKL4  operating  system.  Results  of  prototype 
development are promising, showing performance values which are adequate for a broad 
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Capabilities – A security construct which contains both the reference required to access an 
object, as well as access rights assigned to the capability holder.  Ownership of a 
capability implies permission to access a given resource.
Cell – A virtual construct in the OKL4 operating system.  A logical set of a running  
thread, a memory space, and a zone.
Dnp3 – Distributed Network Protocol, a common communication protocol in industrial 
control systems. 
I2C – Inter-IC bus
IDE – Integrated development environment
IPC – Interprocess communication
Kernel  –  An  operating  system's  lowest  level  abstraction  code,  interfacing  between  
hardware and application code, often performing other duties such as memory  
management, task scheduling and file system management, among others.
MTU – Master terminal unit
Macrokernel  –  An  operating  system  kernel  which  places  code  such  as  file  system  
management, device drivers, and server daemons in kernel-mode code.
Memory space – An OKL4 construct which separates a given section of virtual memory 
from all other sections of virtual memory. 
Microkernel – An operating system kernel which seeks to minimize code which runs in 
kernel-mode.
Modbus – A common communication protocol used in industrial control systems.
vii
OKL4 – A commercially available microkernel operating system, currently the primary 
focus of research on the L4 family of microkernels.
Points – A distinct input or output on a field device.  Examples include digital inputs and 
analog outputs.
Pre-shared Secret – a secret shared previously shared between two systems using a secure 
communications channel, used for authentication and verification of credentials.
RBAC – Role based access control
RTU – Remote terminal unit
RPC – Remote procedure call
SCADA – Supervisory control and data acquisition
SDK – Software development kit
SHA-256 – A cryptographic hashing function which encodes a given set of data as a  
unique 256 bit value.
TFTP – Trivial file transfer protocol
TCP – Transmission control protocol, a core protocol of the Internet protocol stack.
Thread – A piece of code executing concurrently with other pieces of code, switched in 
and out in a “timesharing” manner.
UDP – User datagram protocol. A simpler alternative to TCP which sacrifices reliability 
for speed and simplicity.
XML – Extensible markup language
Zone – A construct in OKL4 defining which memory spaces may access each-other.
viii
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This thesis describes the design, development, and testing of a security hardened 
field  device,  such  as  a  remote  terminal  unit  (RTU)  for  supervisory  control  and  data 
acquisition  (SCADA)  systems.   This  prototype  RTU  is  developed  using  several 
previously  researched,  but  as-of-yet  unconstructed,  architectural  features  which  are 
designed  to  provide  additional  layers  of  security  to  industrial  control  systems which 
control this nation's energy, water and fuel supplies (among many other systems).  This 
thesis will review the pitfalls of existing SCADA systems, explore the possibilities of 
security  hardened  systems  using  new  architectural  structures,  and  describe  the 
development and testing of a prototype RTU utilizing these structures.
1.1 Background
SCADA systems are used in the operation of many industrial systems, from the 
power grid to  potable water distribution: large, monolithic systems which are critical to 
the health and well-being of the citizenry.  These systems are widely distributed, and 
require a large number of remote terminals, each controlling a small number of devices, 
and gathering data from a small number of sensors.  Many of these systems are connected 
to a central control location by a variety of possible commodity communications systems, 
ranging  from radio  links  to  industrial  Ethernet  connections.   Unfortunately,  as  these 
systems have grown larger, the pervasiveness and public awareness of these commodity 
communications systems has also grown.  Corporations and utilities can no longer rely on 
security  through obscurity  to  protect  these  systems.   Further,  with  the  growth of  the 
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Internet, these systems have become increasingly connected, forcing industries to defend 
against security threats well outside these systems' design parameters.
Network security and an understanding of these communications problems can 
only  provide  a  modest  amount  of  security.   Drop in  modules  can  provide  additional 
security,  but  these  control  systems  have  product  lifetimes  measured  in  decades.  The 
security solutions used in these modules may find themselves outmoded or broken in a 
few months or years, becoming a huge expense to any company maintaining a device's 
security.
1.2 Problem
Part  of  the  security  problem  is  endemic  to  the  architecture  utilized  by  these 
devices.  The monolithic kernels used by the operating systems integrated into the RTUs 
currently  on the  market  are  fundamentally  incapable  of  providing the  high  assurance 
security required of such critical control devices.  Formal verification is a key component 
of high assurance systems.  For many years, this verification has been out of reach for 
operating-system kernels.  Several operating systems since the 1970's have attempted to 
claim the crown of verified security, and several certifications exist which provide some 
subjective measurement of security.  For many systems, these measures are sufficient – 
such operating systems are used in the aerospace and defense industries.
Due to the important role kernels play in providing device security, building an 
RTU with high assurance requires the use of a trusted kernel.  A verified operating system 
allows for the development of verifiable security structures.  If these structures operate as 
intended,  then  a  deterministic  level  of  security  can  be  architected,   transcending  the 
2
security of any drop-in device or network security solution.  As a result, it is possible to 
create an RTU whose security is absolutely guaranteed over the lifetime of the device. 
1.3 Motivation
The  creation  of  a  prototype  would  be  impossible  without  the  existence  of  a 
verified secure operating system.  Until now, many architectures for verified operating 
systems have been proposed, and many have endured rigorous testing and certification 
procedures,  only  to  fall  just  short  of  completely  verifiable  performance.   Recently,  a 
research  group  in  Australia  has  reportedly  achieved  the  rigorous  mathematical 
verification of a microkernel based operating system.  Using this operating system, a 
prototype  can  be  developed  using  previously  researched  architectures,  and  its 
performance  measured  in  order  to  determine  the  viability  of  such  an  architecture 
implemented with modern hardware and software.  A security architecture developed by 
Hieb  and  Graham  [33]  considers  the  features  provided  by  a  microkernel  operating-
system, and the possibilities of a formally verified kernel.  Until the development of this 
new  kernel,  the  implementation  of  a  prototype  based  on  this  architecture  has  been 
impossible.
1.4 Organization
The second chapter of this thesis presents a detailed review of related literature 
and research, more clearly defining and developing the summary provided in this chapter. 
Chapter three presents the design architecture, explores the security features developed in 
prior  work,  and  examines how  such  an  architecture  can  be  applied  to  the  verified 
operating  system.   Chapter  four  is  an  in-depth  exploration  of  the  development 
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environment and the prototyping process, reviewing the implementation of the prototype 
from  hardware  to  software.   Chapter  five  describes  the  methods  and  results  of 
performance testing the RTU prototype.   Chapter six summarizes the findings of this 




This review of existing literature provides an overview of the current state and 
history of SCADA security research.  The following sections will detail the work and 
research which has led to the need for the development of a prototype as described in the 
following  chapters.  Section  2.1  provides  an  overview  of  SCADA systems  and  their 
associated security deficiencies. Section 2.2 examines the insufficiencies and failures of 
existing solutions.  Section 2.3 explores  separation and microkernels  in  the context  of 
security solutions, and Section 2.4 explores the existing work done in using microkernels 
in industrial systems.
2.1 SCADA Security
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) is a term that has come to 
refer  to  any and all  devices  involved in  a  computerized,  automatic  industrial  control 
system.  The IEEE defines SCADA systems as “A system operating with coded signals 
over  communication  channels  so  as  to  provide  control  of  remote  equipment  (using 
typically one communication channel per remote station). The supervisory system may be 
combined  with  a  data  acquisition  system,  by  adding  the  use  of  coded  signals  over 
communication channels to acquire information about the status of the remote equipment 
for display or for recording functions[2].”  These systems rose to prominence concurrent 
to microcomputers,  beginning  in  the  1960s.   As  SCADA became  more  popular,  the 
different  architectures  used  became  codified  in  IEEE  Standard  C37.1-2008  [3]. 
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Principally,  there are  three different  SCADA system architectures,  the first  two being 
primarily of historical interest.
Initially,  SCADA systems  were  completely  centralized,  with  a  single  master 
controller station connected directly to sensors, actuators, and other intelligent electronic 
devices (IEDs).  These systems had no connectivity to a greater network of sensors or 
devices.  Eventually, these SCADA systems developed into decentralized systems, with 
one  or  more  master  terminal  units  (MTUs),  and  one  or  more  remote  terminal  units 
(RTUs) [4].  These RTUs were connected to a larger network of MTUs using proprietary, 
industrial  communication  links.  Following  a  period  of  decentralization  in  SCADA 
architecture, these networks transitioned from using proprietary hardware, software and 
communication links,  to using commodity,  commercial  and public hardware,  software 
and communications links, gaining larger connectivity to a network of SCADA devices. 
These  networks  gradually  became  integrated  with  larger  corporate  intranets,  and  the 
Internet [5].
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Figure 2.1: Typical SCADA System Architecture
As  these  SCADA networks  became  part  of  a  larger  network  of  standardized 
hardware and software, the communications protocols used were also standardized.  The 
amount of information that these early links were able to carry limited the amount of 
information that could be expressed using these protocols.  As a result of the initially 
proprietary nature of the links, the bandwidth limitations of the links, and the real-time 
nature of the processes being controlled by SCADA systems, these protocols were not 
designed  with  any  built-in  security  features.   The  protocols  currently  in  broad  use, 
including ModBus, and IEC 60870-5-101 do not include any inherent security features, 
while DNP3 includes provisions for security which remain in draft form [6, 7].
2.1.1 SCADA Security Issues
SCADA security  hasn't  been  a  large  concern  through  the  history  of  SCADA 
systems.  SCADA systems initially used proprietary hardware and software on closed 
networks.  As a result, security was provided by the obscurity of the system, and the lack 
of  general  knowledge as  to  how these  systems operated.   As  a  result,  a  majority  of 
SCADA security threats came from employee sabotage.  As SCADA system have shifted 
from obscure, closed systems, to open, commodity-based systems on open networks, the 
attack vectors have appropriately shifted. A study conducted by Byres and Lowe in 2003 
found that attacks from insiders represented 38% of SCADA  security breaches in 2000, 
with external attacks accounting for 31%, while in 2003, internal attacks represented only 
5% of security breaches and external attacks accounted for another 70% [8].
In summary,  network connectivity and standardization has infiltrated the industry 
in a bid to increase awareness and control. While this has decreased costs, it has also 
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resulted  in  the  pervasive  distribution  of  SCADA systems  which  are  susceptible  to 
electronic attack [9]. In addition to using hardware and software which contains known 
and unknown vulnerabilities, the documentation for these systems is now freely available 
[10],  showing  that  security  through  obscurity  is  no  longer  a  trustworthy  method  for 
maintaining the integrity of SCADA networks.
2.1.2 Securing SCADA Systems
With  the  general  acceptance  that  SCADA systems  have  inherent  insecurities 
which are acting as vectors for outside attack, it is crucial that strategies be developed in 
order to solve these problems.  Because of the commodity hardware being used in these 
SCADA networks,  many sources  suggest  using  common information  technology (IT) 
based  security  practices,  such  as  enabling  WEP on  wireless  devices  [11],  increasing 
network connectivity in order to provide more resiliency to attack [10, 11], implementing 
role based access control  [12], and segmenting the SCADA networking using firewalls 
and virtual private networks [10, 11, 13].
While these methods provide some security, they are insufficient by themselves. 
They fail to properly differentiate between the security needs of a SCADA control 
network and a typical corporate network.  Although the resources used in creating and 
managing these SCADA networks are increasingly similar to the solutions used in 
traditional corporate IT environments, these solutions fail to understand the key 
differences between SCADA systems and IT based systems.
SCADA systems require high data integrity, high up-time and high security at all 
points in the network.  If any leaf of the SCADA network (any RTU, or MTU sub-tree)  
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fails, then the entire SCADA system may have its operation compromised.  The IT based 
solutions focus on high data throughput, with a tolerance for data corruption or loss, and 
principally focus on the confidentiality of data.   As a result,  adopting these IT based 
solutions  in a SCADA environment can be costly, and may not provide the necessary 
protection.  IT based solutions generally focus on making the core of the network secure, 
reliable,  and  robust,  while  security  among  the  leaves  of  the  network  is  allowed  to 
languish.  In  the  SCADA network,  this  cannot  be  tolerated  because  the  leaves  of  the 
network connect  to physical  control systems.   Unfortunately,  the vast  majority  of the 
solutions being deployed and developed today focus on these IT based solutions.
Other systems architectures advocate securing the communication links between 
SCADA  devices  with  drop-in  encryption  modules  [14]. These  modules  provide  a 
reasonably high level of protocol-layer security without adversely affecting performance, 
as  the  IT  based  solutions  might.   Unfortunately,  these  modules  only  encrypt  the 
communication  link,  and  do  not  guard  against  vulnerabilities  in  the  hardware  or  the 
commodity operating  systems running on these SCADA devices.   Furthermore,  these 
devices add a focus on data confidentiality, while data integrity is usually a higher priority 
for SCADA:  an attacker need only understand that these link encryption modules block 
intrusion at only one layer of the SCADA system stack.
2.2 Architectural Security In Kernel Models
Unfortunately,  the  basic  design  architecture  of  using  off-the-shelf  operating 
system software adds an inherent level of risk to the system in question.   Traditional 
operating systems are hugely complicated pieces of software.  The operating system itself 
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can be logically divided into  the  sections which operate in user mode, and  the  sections 
which operate in kernel mode.  The sections which operate in kernel mode provide direct 
abstractions to the hardware that the operating system is running on.  As a result, the 
kernel mode code has special access to the hardware of the system, and operates without 
the  safety  of  memory  segmentation  and  protection.   The  kernel  mode  code  of  any 
operating system must be part of that system's trusted code – that is, the kernel mode code 
must be trusted to perform its duty with certainty and integrity.  
Unfortunately,  the  majority  of  commodity  operating  systems  today  use  a 
monolithic kernel architecture, including massive amounts of code in the kernel of the 
operating system, such as file system code, device driver code, and many many other 
services.  The Linux kernel, as of version 2.6.35, contained over 13.55 million lines of 
code[15].  Some sources estimate the number of lines of code in Windows XP at 40 
million[16].  More code is a direct vector for taking advantage of a system.  Hackers with 
an understanding of the systems being used can exploit bugs, both known and unknown, 
and  larger  systems  inherently  contain  more  bugs.  Various  sources  place  the  average 
number of bugs in a given piece of code between 2 and 75 bugs per 1000 lines of code. 
[17,  18].  Even conservative estimates at the number of errors in a code-base this large 
place  the  number  of  bugs  in  the  tens  of  thousands.   As  a  result,  there  are  inherent 
insecurities and instabilities in operating system kernels of this magnitude.
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2.2.1 Separation Kernels And Microkernels
There is an alternative to this monolithic kernel architecture.  A microkernel is a 
kernel  architecture  which  seeks  to  provide  minimal  kernel  level  abstractions  to  the 
hardware of a given platform.  As a result, these kernels provide minimal services, and 
force  items  like  file  systems  and  device  drivers  to  operate  in  user  mode,  without 
privileged access to all the resources of a system.  
Dr. Jochen Leidtke formalized this concept of minimalist design thusly:
A concept is tolerated inside the microkernel only if moving it outside the  
kernel, i.e., permitting competing implementations, would prevent the  
implementation of the system's required functionality.[19]
As  a  result,  modern  microkernels  provide  very  few  services  familiar  to  monolithic 
kernels.   Figure  2.2  shows  some  of  the  differences  between  monolithic  kernels  and 
microkernels.
Figure 2.2: Monolithic and Micro- Kernel Architectural Differences.
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In Liedtke's implementations, these services were limited to management and protection 
of memory spaces; thread creation, destruction,  management and scheduling; interrupt 
management; and inter-process communication. Due to these cutbacks, a microkernel can 
be  implemented  in  under  ten  thousand lines  of  code.   This  immediately  reduces  the 
number of possible  bugs which can be used as an attack vector by several  orders of 
magnitude.  Additional services must be implemented in user-mode, but much of this 
code need not operate in a completely error-free manner in order to provide a secure 
system.  Tanenbaum,  original  author  of  the  MINIX  operating  system,  advocates  the 
implementation of microkernels as the basis of a secure and reliable system[20].
Although the concept of placing critical operating system services in user space 
has  existed  since  at  least  the  1960s  [21], UNIX  and  BSD  remained  the  dominant 
operating systems of the era, and these operating systems made a design decision to place 
services  such  as  device  drivers  and  file  systems  in  the  kernel.   As  a  result  of  the 
popularity  of  UNIX  and  BSD,  many  other  operating  systems  followed  suite  in  this 
monolithic design.
In the 1970's, Tymshare Inc. began development of a new operating system called 
GNOSIS,  (The  Great  New  Operating  System  in  the  Sky)  which  would  evolve  into 
KeyKOS, and later EROS, as the concept and source code were bought and sold.  The 
EROS operating system, a self-claimed “nanokernel” operating system, was designed to 
be an extremely reliable and secure operating system.  This operating system provides 
security and separation through the communication of “capabilities.”  These capabilities 
are unforgeable representations of the rights which a program has for a specific operating-
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system object.  Although the foundations of EROS were laid in the 1970s, development 
and implementation of these concepts took place primarily in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  EROS has two successor projects, CoyotOS and  CapOS.  These projects are lead 
by two of the principal developers of the EROS project..  As of 2010, development for 
both these projects remain inactive.  Despite being proclaimed a “nanokernel,” the source 
tree for the final release of EROS is over twice as large as modern microkernels.
To  block  all  layers  of  possible  intrusion,  an  operating  system  known  as  a 
“separation kernel” was proposed as early as 1981 by  Dr. John Rushby [22].  This kernel 
would  treat  software  components  as  if  they  were  pieces  of  a  physically  distributed 
system.  Each piece of software must have no interaction with software extant to itself, 
save  for  a  known quantity  of  communication  paths.   Thus,  the  flow  of  information 
between components of a separation kernel system may be completely known.  As of 
2010, only a single separation kernel has received any sort of formal certification [23].
In 1984,  development began on the Mach kernel at Carnegie Mellon[24]. This 
kernel  is  one  of  the  first  examples  of  a  kernel  designed with  microkernel  principals 
throughout.  Unfortunately, the purpose of this kernel was to support operating system 
research, primarily in the areas of parallel and distributed computing.  As a result, this 
kernel  was  not  designed  with  minimality  and  security  in  mind,  but  rather  sought  to 
emulate the UNIX kernel in whole.  As a result, the source tree became extremely large, 
the  result  of  attempting  to  fit  monolithic  kernel  attributes  into  the  microkernel 
architecture.  Additionally, during the early 1990s, CPU speed grew at over 60% per year, 
while  memory  speed  grew  at  only  7%  during  this  same  period.   The  necessity  of 
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switching in and out of kernel mode in order to perform routine microkernel tasks like 
memory  space  management  and interprocess  communication  requires  more  access  to 
memory  than  a  comparable  monolithic  kernel.   As  a  result  of  this  rising  difference 
between  CPU and  memory  speed,  performance  of  microkernels  waned.  Between  the 
increasing size of code, and the waning kernel performance, the interest in microkernels 
spurred by Mach and  other projects declined.
Roughly concurrent to the development of the Mach kernel, Tanenbaum released 
MINIX, a microkernel operating system designed to be a minimal implementation of a 
UNIX operating system.  This operating system was designed to be a companion for a 
textbook on operating systems.  As a result,  security and minimality were not design 
goals.   The first  version of  the operating system, however,  was implemented in  only 
12,000 lines of code, which is comparable with modern microkernels. 
The QNX operating system is another example of a microkernel based operating 
system.  This operating system began as a research project at University of Waterloo in 
1980.  This project has evolved, and changed hands many times, however.  Some versions 
of the QNX operating system have been available as open-source products, while others 
have not.  The most recent version, which has received a certificate of security evaluation, 
is currently closed source and owned by Research in Motion[25]. QNX has seen used in 
many  high  reliability  systems.   Although  this  operating  system  has  been  proven 
commercially, and achieves similar performance to the L4 Microkernel, its certificate of 
verification is based on informal criteria of evaluation.
Following the decline of the Mach microkernel, Liedtke began research on a new 
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generation of microkernels.  Throughout the mid 1990s, until his death in 2001, Leidtke 
developed several new microkernel paradigms that would prove that microkernels were 
not  required  to  perform badly  [21,  26]. The  L3  and  L4  microkernels  achieved  their 
performance goals by tightly  coupling the algorithms used to  perform memory space 
management  and IPC to the target  system architecture.   Earlier  work had focused on 
creating a microkernels which weren't bound to a specific set of hardware, as well as 
creating a kernel which could place important services in user mode.  Liedtke's kernels 
were the first to be designed specifically with performance in mind.  The L4 operating 
system was written primarily in assembly language and C.  Porting this operating system 
to other architectures was a daunting task.   The L4::Hazelnut project was the first  to 
successfully  translate  the L4 operating  system into  C++ without  a  great  performance 
penalty.  The L4::Pistachio project would further build on the success of the L4 kernel, 
and  generalize  the  architecture  specific  algorithms  and  programming  interface, 
decoupling the kernel code from the target architecture, with the exception of only a few 
required assembly-language function implementations [29].
2.2.2 The OKL4 Microkernel
The OKL4 Microkernel is a descendant of the L4::Pistachio kernel, implementing 
a  capability  based  security  system similar  to  the  one  implemented  by  EROS.   This 
microkernel is a good example of a third-generation microkernel [27].  In order to more 
fully explain the operating principals of a modern microkernel, OKL4 will be used as an 
example.  The current version of OKL4 is Version 3.0, and is available as open-source 
software from NICTA.
15
The OKL4 microkernel, as a direct descendant of Liedtke's L4 kernel, implements 
minimal  operating  system abstractions,  including  memory  space  management,  thread 
management,  and  interprocess  communication  (IPC).   Additionally,  the  OKL4 kernel 
exports  management  of  kernel  resources  to  user  mode  processes  using  a  modified, 
simplified  capability  system  from  the  EROS  operating  system.   These  capabilities 
represent a non-forgeable token of an object,  as well  as the program's permissions to 
operate  on  or  with  the  object.  As  a  result,  memory  spaces,  thread,  and  IPC can  be 
controlled from user mode processes with a measurable assurance of security [28].
In the OKL4 operating system, threads may have one or more memory spaces 
mapped to them.  These  memory spaces  present  themselves  as  virtual  memory to  the 
thread.  This virtual memory, however, must be backed by physical memory allocated to 
the  OKL4 kernel  or  a  delegating  user-mode  program.   The  specific  mapping  of  this 
memory is known only to the kernel, or a user-mode memory delegation implementation. 
As a result, in order to learn about this specific  memory mapping, a thread must have 
appropriate capabilities, ensuring that threads cannot inspect or modify memory to which 
they  have  no  capabilities.  Threads  are  switched  in  a  round-robin  fashion,  based  on 
priority.
Interprocess communication (IPC) is the basis of interrupt management, remote 
procedure call (RPC) implementations, and data transfer between threads.  In OKL4, IPC 
is abstracted depending upon its specific use.  In all cases, in order for IPC to take place,  
the communicating cell must have capabilities to the recipient cell.  If so desired, the 
communicating cell can transmit temporary “reply” capabilities to the recipient cell in 
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order to receive a response.  These reply capabilities are temporary.  If IPC takes place 
between threads in the same memory space,  then a full  kernel-mode switch need not 
occur, saving CPU cycles.  If an IPC takes place between threads existing in different 
memory spaces, then the OKL4 operating system uses a system-specific implementation 
of the IPC algorithms pioneered by Leidtke in developing the L4 microkernel, and later 
L4::Pistachio.   Determining  the  fastest  method  of  transmitting  information  between 
threads is very important in a microkernel environment.  
Performance  completely  drives  the  design  decisions,  since  in  a  microkernel 
environment, every IPC transfer between memory spaces requires a transition into kernel 
mode  and  back  again,  which  requires  a  large  number  of  CPU cycles.  Interrupts  are 
handled just like any other IPC.  The cell which is configured to receive a given interrupt 
must have capabilities to this interrupt.  As a result, whenever this interrupt is triggered, 
the kernel will send an IPC message to the thread receiving the interrupt.  Requiring IPC 
to trigger interrupt service further drives the need for fast IPC.  It is also worth noting that 
particular implementations of the IPC API and algorithms used by Liedtke are strongly 
architecture dependent.  A presentation by Gernot Heiser in 2008 summarizes the actual 
L4 IPC performance for different architectures as shown in table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Cost of Minimal L4 IPC Transfer on Various Architectures[29]
Architecture Intra Address 
Space
Inter Address Space
Pentium 113 Cycles 305 Cycles
AMD-64 125 Cycles 230 Cycles
Itanium 36 Cycles 36 Cycles
MIPS64 109 Cycles 109 Cycles
ARM Xscale 170 cycles 180Cycles
2.2.3 The SeL4 Kernel
In addition to providing fewer possible vectors for software-level attack,  these 
second generation  microkernels  are  small  enough to  go  through a  process  of  formal 
verification, whereby the code implemented by the operating system is proven to operate 
without any bugs by a set of mathematical proofs.  With only a few thousand lines of 
code, and a minimal number of operating system hooks into user space, this verification 
is no longer as daunting as it would be if performed on a code base of 15 million lines of 
code.  Researchers at  National Information and Communications Technology Australia 
(NICTA) have developed an operating system based on L4::Pistachio called the seL4 
kernel.  After over seven man-years of labor, they have  reportedly performed a formal 
verification on this microkernel, with over two hundred thousand human-and-computer 
generated proofs.[30]
This  verification  is  a  tremendous  leap  forward  in  creating  secure  and reliable 
computer systems.  However, it is not without assumptions.  One must trust the compiler, 
the  hardware,  and  the  proof  generator.   The  compiler  used  for  this  verification  is  a 
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derivative of the freely available GCC C-compiler, which is monolithic enough that a 
formal verification would be daunting, at best.  Gerwin Klein has performed some initial 
work at NICTA in the use of a verified C compiler to compile the seL4 kernel [26], which 
shows promise at being a viable alternative to GCC.  The seL4 kernel is designed to 
adhere to most ANSI C standards.  This avenue is one road that could be taken to extend 
the research being performed at NICTA.  Klein suggests that another avenue is to begin 
the  implementation  of  large-scale  trusted  systems,  such as  the  long-theoretical  MILS 
architecture. [31]
As a result of this verification, secure, trusted software can be built on top of the 
kernel, with the separation between user-mode memory spaces abstracted as trustworthy. 
This makes the creation of a minimal trusted computing base (the parts of code which can 
bypass and compromise system security [32]) possible.  Now, the formal verification of a 
minimalist TCB can build on the verification of the kernel itself, to create a larger secure 
system.
2.3 A Secure Industrial System Using Microkernels
As   a  result  of  the  minimalist  nature  of  these  microkernels,  and  the  formal 
verification to which they can be subjected, they can be used to create secure embedded 
systems.  Demanding real-time requirements  exist  in almost  all  SCADA applications. 
IEEE and IEC standards state that many SCADA applications require a response time as 
low as 2-4 ms [33].  As a result, the microkernel based solution cannot be performance 
bound.  Initial research in the implementation of a microkernel based industrial control 
system suggest that this is not an impossible task, with raw IPC times as low as 69.54 
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microseconds  [1]. Additionally,  the seL4 microkernel represents a basis upon which a 
secure  separation  kernel  can  be  built,  implementing  with  measurable  certainty,  a 




This  chapter  details  the  design  goals  of  the  security  hardened  RTU prototype 
based on the architecture described by Hieb and Graham [1].  Many of these design goals 
are  derived from earlier  work,  as  described in  Chapter  II.   While  the  body of  work 
contained in Chapter II describes the security vulnerabilities in existing SCADA systems 
and  explores  the  possibilities  for  a  security  hardened  RTU  based  on  microkernel 
operating  systems,  this  chapter  details  a  specific  target  architecture,  designed  with 
consideration for the needs of actual development,  as well  as the hardware available. 
Section 3.1 outlines the  architectural model, developed by Hieb and Graham [1] of a 
security-hardened RTU, with respect  for  the possible  avenues  of implementation,  and 
Section  3.2  details  some of  the  prior  work  performed  in  creating  an  RTU with  this 
architecture.  Section 3.3 details how OKL4 design paradigms may be utilized for for the 
specified  implementation,  Section  3.4  details  a  simplified  SCADA communications 
protocol created for testing the security features and performance of the RTU, Section 3.5 
explains  the  operation  of  interprocess  communication  (IPC)  and  the  communications 
paths through the RTU, Section 3.6 explains the usage and design of a challenge-response 
algorithm, and Section 3.7 describes the role based access control model utilized in this 
prototype.
3.1 Architecture Model And Security Features
The security hardened RTU is based on an iterative design model proposed by 
Hieb,  Graham and Patel  in  a  series  of  papers  on possible  security  enhancements  for 
21
SCADA systems.  Through several papers and dissertations, this design model became 
increasingly specific to the architecture which could be implemented under the OKL4 
operating system, as described in section 2.3.1.  The model targeted at the beginning of 
the project was described by Hieb and Graham in [1], as shown in figure 3.1.
Research performed by Graham, Hieb and Patel, among many others (See Section 
2.1)   has  shown  that  the  current  monolithic  kernel   architectures  contain  inherent 
insecurities which cannot be easily mitigated through software.  The above architecture, 
developed by Hieb and Graham is an alternative to the predominant architectures. In this 
new architecture, all components  need not reside in the trusted computing base (TCB). 
The security benefits of such an architecture have been reinforced by Klein, among the 
primary developers of the OKL4 family of operating systems [31], in describing the use 
of a system very similar to this for providing security to embedded devices in a more 
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Figure 3.1: Target Architecture from [1]
general sense (not just SCADA systems).
The architecture modeled in figure 3.1 visualizes the software infrastructure of a 
security hardened RTU. There are three isolated components: Network IO, Security, and 
Physical IO.  This architecture decouples principal RTU functions from each other.  The 
Network IO layer  is  part  of  the untrusted computing base (UTCB),  and is  a  generic 
interface  to  the  physical  method  of  communicating  with  the  RTU,  whether  this  is 
industrial Ethernet, RS485, wireless data, or some other medium.  This portion of the 
UTCB is  only capable  of  sending inter-process  communication (IPC) to  the Security 
segment.  There is no direct path of communication or memory manipulation between the 
Network IO and the Physical IO.
The use of a microkernel based operating system opens the possibility of creating 
a trusted computing base (TCB) which can be formally and rigorously verified.   The 
security layer contains all  of these necessary trusted components, including the kernel 
code. The security layer is capable of communicating with both the Network IO and the 
Physical IO.  As a result, this trusted layer must mediate  all communications between 
these two untrusted components.  This layer ensures the integrity of clients across the 
network layer with features such as hashing and handshaking.  The security module also 
ensures that clients posses the appropriate permissions to perform a given action, using 
role based access control.  Although these functions are linked logically, they are, in fact, 
separate;  hashing  and  handshaking  verifies  the  integrity  of  the  communication  path, 
ensuring resistance against threats such as man-in-the-middle and replay attacks, while 
the role based access control layer ensures that the end user is performing appropriate 
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actions  (a  vendor,  for  example,  cannot  change  set-points,  but  may  be  able  to  view 
operations).  Since the security layer is part of the trusted component of the system, it 
must be fast.  In order to be feasibly verifiable, it must be small.  The security layer must 
be built to facilitate later verification of functionality.
Finally, the physical IO layer consists of software which interfaces with a set of 
external  hardware in  order  to  generate  outputs  and accept  inputs  from the  connected 
control  system.   The  code  to  operate  this  subsystem  is  untrusted,  and  may  only 
communicate with the security layer.  Otherwise, the hardware and functionality of this 
portion is comparable to currently available and legacy commercial RTUs.
This architecture may be realized using the OKL4 operating system described in 
Chapter  2.   As described in  section 2.2.2,  the  OKL4 operating  system makes use of 
memory segments, protection domains, and zones.  These are combined in a logical unit 
called a “cell.”  These cells are logically separate– in fact, during the compilation process, 
they are compiled and linked as though they were  independent programs.  A  utility 
called “Elf Weaver” combines these separate programs with the kernel code to create 
a  bootable system image.   Thus,  when considered with the verification model  of  the 
OKL4 kernel describe in section 2.3.2, we can understand a cell as a realization of the 
kind of separation architecture described above, with the exception of two trusted “cells”– 
in OKL4, the kernel remains in a separate memory space and protection domain.
Each of the segments described above resides in its own cell. The physical IO 
resides in a cell with the remainder of the untrusted computing base.  This includes utility 
functionality,  such  as  hardware  management,  and  debug  interfaces.   Much  of  this 
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functionality is a side-effect of creating a device which must be intricately monitored for 
development reasons.  Security must reside in its own cell to perform trusted IPC with 
network  and  physical  IO.   Network  IO  resides  in  a  third,  separate  cell.   Utility 
functionality,  such  as  hardware  management,  debug  interfaces,  and  test  code  reside 
separate from network IO due to the complexity of the network IO code and the desire to 
keep  possible  bugs  as  deconvolved  as  possible.   This  design  decisions  simplifies 
development, and is otherwise arbitrary.
3.2 Prior Work
This  section  highlights  and  details  some  sections  of  Chapter  II  which  are  of 
particular import to the development of the prototype using the OKL4 operating system, 
based on an architecture described by Hieb and Graham [1].  In 2007, Graham, Hieb and 
Patel investigated the SCADA security issues described previously, and reached a number 
of conclusions regarding possible directions for future research, briefly investigating the 
feasibility  of  minimizing  an  existing  real  time  operating  system  kernel,  developing 
enhanced  SCADA protocols,  and  implementing  role  based  access  control  on  top  of 
existing access control and security-hardening layers [34].  Hieb and Graham continued 
this line of research in 2008, exploring the benefits that an isolation kernel (described 
briefly in 2.3.2) would provide to a security enhanced SCADA system[1].  Importantly, 
they also performed initial experimentation using the OKL4 operating system,  exploring 
the speed of IPC calls on real hardware.  These investigations served as initial steps at 
developing the architecture,  demonstrating that IPC overhead would not be a limiting 
factor  in  development.   Hieb  further  described  the  architecture  modeled  above,  and 
25
continued to describe (in great detail) a role based access control system  for SCADA 
systems, providing a framework for a role based access control system suitable for the 
prototype  RTU considered  herein  [35].   A patent  application  has  been  filed  for  this 
technology. [36]
3.3 Isolating Components With Cells And Threads
As mentioned above, there are two primary methods of dividing up the computing 
resources of a system running the OKL4 operating system – cells and threads.  Threads in 
OKL4 are identical to threads in other operating systems.  A program executed as a thread 
shares time on the CPU by well-understood principals of context switching.  A cell, on 
the other hand, is a combination of many other constructs in the OKL4 Operating System. 
“Cell” is a glossary term, and does not actually exist as a programmatic interface in the 
operating system.  A cell is a combination of a memory segment and protection domain, 
within which runs one or more threads.
A memory segment is simply an allocation of virtual memory, carved from the 
larger physical memory of the system.  The address spaces of this virtual memory maps in 
a one-to-one basis with the physical memory, and must be page-aligned with the physical 
memory, but its addressing schema is different.  A protection domain is a set of memory 
segments which are isolated from all other memory segments on the system.  Memory 
segments inside a given protection domain have no way of being accessed from outside, 
and threads executing inside a protection domain have no access to memory segments 
outside their protection domain.  As a general rule, memory segments cannot be mapped 
into  more  than  one  protection  domain.   Although  there  are  exceptions  to  this,  the 
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utilization of these features is not necessary for the completion of this project.
The distinction between physical and virtual memory is important.  In the OKL4 
operating system, all non-kernel operations exist in virtual memory space, which allows 
for  the  levels  of  isolation  which  make  it  possible  to  implement  critical  security 
components.   The hardware utilities  and various low-level  faculties  of  the device are 
accessed using memory-mapped hardware.  The configuration and data registers for these 
various devices reside in physical memory.  This physical memory can be mapped into 
the virtual memory space, and the running program can discover its location at runtime 
without a great deal of trouble.  Unfortunately, the same set of physical memory cannot 
be mapped in a read/write manner to two protection domains, which enforces this verified 
memory segment protection.  As a result, there are some utility functions, such as power 
and clock management, which must reside in a central location.  In the case of functions 
like these, a hardware manager thread is necessary.  This hardware manager responds to 
requests over IPC from other cells, configuring common memory-mapped peripherals, 
and responds when these actions are complete.  Compare this to a traditional (macro) 
kernel in which all driver operations have unfettered access to the  entirety of physical 
memory.
For  the  purpose  of  debugging during  development,  it  is  necessary  to  create  a 
thread with access  to  a common serial  output.   This serial  output  provides  a way to 
display debug messages from multiple cells concurrently.  This debug data can then be 
transmitted through IPC to the serial debug thread, which then utilizes the hardware of 
the device to generate actual output.  Otherwise, the physical serial device would map to a 
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single memory space, limiting the debug output.  This becomes an issue when trying to 
debug IPC communications calls across multiple threads and protection domains.
Threads in OKL4 must execute within the context of a protection domain.  More 
than one thread can exist within a protection domain, and if this is the case, each thread 
has unfettered access to the virtual memory mapped within that protection domain.  From 
3.1, a deliberate decision was made to place utility functionality separate from network 
functionality, in the same cell as the physical IO.  This is partially due to the complexity 
of the network code.  For the development phase of the project, it is desirable to minimize 
the possible source of multiply conflicting, convoluted bugs in the network code.
Threads in the OKL4 operating system can either be declared and initialized at 
compile time, using the elfweaver utility,  or created at  run-time.   Creating threads at 
compile time is  relatively simple.   These threads begin at  the start  of execution,  and 
continue until they terminate themselves.  Capabilities, required to send IPC calls to these 
threads, can be declared at compile time, and assigned to other threads with which they 
must interact.  Unfortunately, there is no built-in manner to spawn, fork, or externally 
terminate new threads of this type.  Run time threads are better suited for applications 
requiring these features.  Run time threads are created by another thread.  This originating 
thread must carve out a memory space for these new threads, and must take care of their  
operation  and  termination.   The  major  down  side  to  this  method  is  the  creation  of 
capabilities, which are required to communicate with the new threads.  Upon starting, 
only  the  originating  thread  has  any  knowledge  of  the  capabilities  required  to 
communicate to these threads.  As a result,  in order for disparate cells and threads to 
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communicate, the originating thread must express this capability through IPC.  As the 
features  of  run  time  threads  were  not  required  for  the  construction  of  the  target 
architecture, they were not used in favor of the easy of compile time threads.
In summary, for the purposes of development, there are three cells implemented in 
the prototype.  The network IO and security cells  run a single thread each, while the 
utility cell operates three threads-- one for network IO, one for hardware management, 
and one for serial debug.  All threads, across all cells run at the same priority level.  These 
threads are context switched in a round-robin fashion, without respect for their  given 
protection domains or memory segments.
3.4 Inter-Cell Communication Using IPC
All communication between  components must occur through IPC, and the IPC 
structures  in  the  OKL4 operating  system are  critical  to  the  implementation  of  more 
complex structures, such as remote procedure call (RPC). The rules of communication 
must be well planned out and understood before development.  Due to the complexity of 
initializing hardware in an operating system which provides such strong protection across 
memory segments, the startup sequence must be planned separate from the steady-state 
IPC methodologies.   There is  a large amount  of synchrony between and among cells 
which must be planned for and understood in order to avoid race conditions which could 
cause the RTU to deadlock, either in operation or during startup.
There are two types of IPC calls in OKL4: blocking and non-blocking.  Blocking 
calls will halt a process until the conditions for sending or receiving a given IPC are met. 
Non-blocking calls will attempt to deliver or receive an IPC message, and if the parter in 
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the communication is not ready, the attempt will fail.   There are two communications 
primitives: send and receive.  In order for a thread to send data to another thread, it must 
have a capability to the target thread.  The capability is an object which can be passed 
from thread to thread, or declared at compile time.  This capability is a combination of 
both the location of the receiving thread, as well as permissions to access this thread.  The 
sending thread may opt to send “reply” capabilities alongside an instance of IPC.  These 
reply capabilities are temporary capabilities to return data to the sending thread.  They are 
invalid after the conclusion of the IPC.
These send and receive primitives combined with the ability  to  transmit  reply 
capabilities can be combined in complex ways in order to achieve the security goals of 
the project.  For the security hardened RTU, only blocking primitives are necessary.  The 
flow of IPC through cells can be modeled as a finite state machine.  Because of this, 
threads have no need to continue operating while they are awaiting a message,
As mentioned above, there are two “time periods” of interest for IPC.  During 
startup,  the hardware manager  must  enable hardware and alert  cells  to the initialized 
hardware in an order which does not halt the system.  Race conditions must be avoided. 
During startup, the communication taking place is as shown in Figure 3.2.
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The  hardware  manager  initializes  hardware  for  serial  debug,  physical  IO,  and 
network IO.  The hardware manager then permanently halts.  Subsequently, the physical 
IO and Network IO communicate with the serial debug thread.  All threads then enter a 
wait  state.   The serial  debug may receive an IPC message from any thread,  and will  
output this message to the terminal.  Blocking “send” calls are used in order to ensure that 
all debug output will be seen.  If a cell cannot deliver its output, it will wait until the 
serial debug is available.  As a side-effect, however, the serial debug must be stable.  Any 
crashes in the serial debug thread will halt  the system.  This ensures that testing and 
debugging remain consistent and simple, but provides a method for halting the system 
abruptly.  In a production device, there would be no serial debug, so this is not a security 
issue.  The serial debug is simply a reality of development.  During steady-state, the chain 
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Figure 3.2: IPC messages during Start-up
of IPC events can be modeled as in Figure 3.3.
In  figure  3.1,  a  message  is  delivered  to  the  network  cell,  and  relayed  to  the 
security cell.  The security cell flags this as a critical point, and demands that the request 
be authenticated.  It relays this demand to the network IO layer.  A valid authentication is 
returned  and  verified  by  the  security  cell.   The  queued  operation  is  then  internally 
recalled, and its permissions are checked inside the security cell.  These permissions are 
valid, and the security cell passes the command to the Physical IO layer, which returns 
some data.  This data is then passed through the security layer to the network IO cell for 
relay to the original client.
32
Figure 3.3:  IPC from Network  Event  to  Physical  IO,  given  proper  role  based 
access control credentials
Figure 3.4 shows a similar attempt to request some data.  This time, the given 
RBAC credentials  disallow the operation.  As a result,  the security cell replies to the 
network  cell  to  re-enter  its  wait  state,  without  sending a  response.   From these  two 
examples,  it's  very easy to  see the statefullness of  the system.  Figure 3.5 shows all 
possible states.
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Figure 3.4: IPC from network event to physical IO, given improper  role based 
access control credentials
This IPC ties the handshaking and role based security features together.  All of 
these operations are performed in the security cell, after being received by the network 
cell.
3.5 Security Features
The security hardened prototype will utilize several layers of security which have 
been implemented on devices in the past.  With the ability to place these features inside a 
verified trusted computing base, these features become much more trustworthy.  First, a 
simplified  SCADA  protocol  was developed.  This  protocol reasonably  emulates 
commercial SCADA protocols, allowing for easy expansion with new security features, 
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Figure 3.5: Full state diagram for IPC.
which can then be tested for security, performance and reliability.  This protocol is used 
internally  and externally.  External transit is provided by the UDP protocol.  A standard 
handshaking authentication method is used to verify the integrity of users attempting to 
use the communication link, and a role base access control layer ensures that they users 
are permitted to perform the actions they are requesting.
3.5.1 A Simplified SCADA Protocol
Modern  SCADA devices  utilize  a  large  number  of  different  communications 
protocols over a large number of different potential communications media.  The RTU 
prototype  will  communicate  solely  over  Ethernet.   In  order  to  test  the  security  and 
performance  of  this  RTU,  a  full  suite  of  SCADA functionality  is  unnecessary,  and 
developmentally  burdensome.   Protocols  like  ModBus  and  DNP3  can  very  quickly 
become  complicated,  and  the  prototype  RTU  will  not  support  the  majority  of  these 
protocols'  features,  in  any case.   For  development  and testing,  a  very basic  SCADA 
protocol is needed.
This  protocol  must   implement  the minimum number of features  necessary to 
properly emulate a typical RTU, and remain extensible for the addition and testing of 
security features.  SCADA operations affect control points, and control points may be 
either  read,  selected,  or  operated  upon.   Modern  SCADA protocols  require  a  select 
followed by an operate (with identical data payloads) in order to alter the setting of a 
given  point.   In  addition  to  this,  we  must  generate  responses  to  read  request,  and 
implement our hashing and handshaking algorithm.  Operate and select operations do not 
require a response.  In order to verify the operation of an operate  or select, the user 
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performs a  read operation.  This write-then-read paradigm is common to many SCADA 
systems,  and  is  not  unique  to  this  prototype.   With  this  description,  our  simplified 
SCADA protocol must implement only five operations.  Protocols such as ModBus and 
DNP3 derive their respective complexities through support for complex addressing, CRC 
and  data  integrity  verifications,  and  standardized  maps  of  points  and  operations  and 
implementations of a variety of  standardized data expression techniques.
In  order  to  implement  the  role  based  access  control  mechanisms described in 
section 3.7, each operation must be associate to a specified user.  Beyond this, the data 
required for an operation is dependent on the operation.  A read operation requires only 
the  point  which  must  be  acted  upon.   A select  or  an  operate  operation,  meanwhile, 
requires  both  a  point  and  data.   Read  responses  include  only  return  data,  without 
notification of which point the read response is for.  Challenge requests include a payload 
of a server nonce, while  challenge responses include a client nonce, as well as a SHA-
256 hash.
For the prototype, the payload size for user identification will be one byte, point 
identification will be one byte, point data will be one byte, nonces will be 4 bytes, and the 
SHA-256 is 32 bytes.  The total size of the packet payloads, as well as operation ID is 
summarized in Table 3-1.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Simplified SCADA Communications Protocol used in RTU Design
Operational Type Operation ID Data
Read Point 0x00 3 bytes
Select Point 0x01 4 bytes




Challenge-Response 0x04 36 bytes
Read Response 0x05 4 bytes
The data size indicated above includes the user and point ID bytes, but does not 
include the operation ID byte.
For reading a point, the data format is:
<Operation ID>+<User ID>+<Point ID>,
each a one-byte field.
For select or operate operations, the format is:
<Operation ID>+<User ID>+<Point ID>+<Data>
For initial testing, Select simply operates as a “write” operation, although typical SCADA 
systems require a select followed by an operate, containing identical data.
For demand-response operations, the format is: 
<Operation ID>+<Server Nonce>
with the server nonce being a 4 byte field.
For challenge-response operations, the format is
<Operation ID>+<Client Nonce>+<Hash>
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The client nonce is a four byte field, while the  hash is a four byte field.  Although 
the SHA-256 hash is 32 bytes in length, many commercial SCADA devices compare only 
the first  four bytes for authentication. In this implementation, neither the client nor the 
server require the originating message to be hashed along with the nonce.   This was 
excluded for simple testing and rapid development,  but is a trivial  addition given the 
current state of the code base.
For read response operations, the format is
 <Operation ID>+<User ID>+<Point ID>+<Data>.
In all of the above cases, '+' indicates bit concatenation.  There is no delimiter of 
information, other than the knowledge that each field is a strictly fixed length.
Below is an example of a “Read Response” packet, sent using user ID two, from 
point ID ten:
0x05 0x02 0x0A 0x01
Read User ID Point ID
Returned 
Data
This information will be wrapped in the payload of a standard UDP packet. The 
port 1200 is selected arbitrarily.  UDP is selected due to its simplicity and ubiquity in 
modern Ethernet  networks.   A stateless  UDP engine can be trivially  constructed,  and 
many, many programming languages and development environments include methods for 
interacting with standard UDP packets.  Additionally, these UDP packets are routeable 
across the larger  Internet.
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On the RTU, the code which sends and receives these simplified SCADA packets 
is very simple.  The decision tree for this functionality is shown in Figure 3.6.
As can be seen, there are only a handful of decisions points in the packet reception 
mechanism.  This greatly simplifies the network layer code required.  This decision tree is 
simplified and does not represent the role based access control decisions being made by 
the security layer.  This diagram also does not represent the role the security cell must 
play  in  generating  hashes  and  performing  handshaking.   The  simple  SCADA packet 
reception code does not need any awareness of state in order to perform its duties– it is 
not required to keep track of authentications, points read, or any other state.  For read 
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Figure 3.6: Decision tree for SCADA packet reception.
requests, the RTU will send a response, and allow the client to sort out which packet for 
which response is  directed.   For  handshaking,  the requested operation is  placed on a 
queue, and if the client responds with valid authentication, this action is removed from 
the queue, and placed through the simple SCADA decision tree as though it were any 
other packet.  Failed attempts to authenticate are simply ignored.
3.5.2  User Authentication And Handshaking
The method for determining the authenticity of the clients is a simple challenge-
response  handshake  using  a  pre-shared  secret.   This  is  computationally  simple,  and 
actively used in commercial SCADA devices.  The only prerequisites for this method of 
authentication are the ability to generate random numbers, and the ability to perform a 
SHA-256 hash.  The algorithm itself is trivially simple.
For the purpose of the prototype, it is sufficient to demonstrate that hashing can be 
performed,  and  that  it  is  both  fast  and  reliable.   For  the  prototype,  hashing  is  only 
performed on points which are declared “critical.”  If a critical point is manipulated, an 
authentication  is  demanded  of  the  client,  regardless  of  how  recent  a  previous 
authentication may have occurred.  Future implementations and expansions of this system 
may  consider  more  complex  methods  of  determining  when  a  challenge-response 
handshake should occur, and include features such as caching of credentials.
If  a  critical  point  is  requested,  this  operation is  cached,  and the server  (RTU) 
demands a response from the client. This response includes a nonce generated by the 
server.  The client receives this request, and generates its own nonce.  These values are 
bitwise-concatenated with a pre-shared secret.  A SHA-256 hash is generated on this bit 
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concatenation, and the hash value, along with the client nonce are returned to the server. 
Upon reception, the server verifies the authenticity of the hash, and if the hash is valid, 
pulls the operation off the queue, and executes the operation as though it were a new 
request.  If the hash is invalid, no response is sent, and the RTU re-enters a wait state.
3.5.3  Role Based Access Control
The  role  based  access  control  to  be  implemented  on  this  RTU  prototype  is 
modeled after the access control  system described in Hieb[35].  In order  to facilitate 
prototyping,  this  system has  been simplified from the system Hieb describes.   These 
changes  facilitated  the  rapid  development  of  a  system  which  can  demonstrate  the 
capability of a limited RTU to perform complex security operations using IPC of the sort 
found  in  the  OKL4  operating  system.   The  principal  sacrifice  is  that  of  future 
expandability. Although the role based access control system described herein implements 
most  of  the  features  described  by  Hieb,  they  will  not  be  expandable  without  some 
sacrifice in performance.
There are several object types in this role based access control system.  “User” 
refers to the credentials passed to the RTU and “Points” represent the physical IO to be 
manipulated or read. Users maintain membership to one or more roles, and these roles 
have access to one or more sets of permissions.  A permission is a set consisting of a point 
combined with point access controls.  A point is a physical IO (or abstraction of physical 
IO) whose state may be altered, while a permission represents the actions that may be 
performed on the IO.  In the target implementation, permissions may be read-only access 
or full-access.
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Points have associated point types, which are labels used to more broadly control 
permissions.   Roles  have,  in  addition  to  associated  permissions,  point  type  controls, 
which govern whether or not a role may have access to a given point type regardless of 
permission.  Roles further have point access constraints, which are further restrictions on 
how a role may access a given point.  In the target implementation, only time-of-day and 
day-of-week  point  access  constraints  are  considered,  while  Hieb  describes  further 
restrictions, such as terminal location, among others.
Users have a similar constraint in the form of role access constraints.  Users may 
have restrictions placed on how they may use a particular role to which they are assigned. 
The goal targeted only temporal restrictions, while Hieb further expands on the possible 
implementations of such restrictions.  Permissions in this manner are assigned in a logical 
OR fashion:  If any of the  set of permissions assigned to a user allow an action, this 
action is allowed to occur.  If the action is not allowed to occur, the client is not notified 
of this failure.  Only later reinspection will inform the user that their access permissions 
have been denied.
In  order  to  simplify  development,  roles,  users,  points  and  all  other  controls 
relating to the RBAC feature are hard-coded into the system, and cannot be modified at 
run-time.  Any access constraints which depend on information other than time of day 
have not been designed into this system.  In order to check permissions and easily iterate 
through  sets  of  permissions,  users,  and  points,  many  access  controls  are  stored  as 
bitfields.  This allows the use of native bitwise logic operations in order to determine 
positions.  Since these permissions are permissive by default, their inspection is simple.
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3.6 Design Summary
The  security  hardened  prototype  architecture  makes  use  of  several  security 
features available with a microkernel like OKL4, which provides the ability the separate 
thread  and  memory  spaces.   Figure  3.1  provides  a  high  level  overview  of  this 
architecture, which will be implemented in the OKL4 operating system using thread and 
cells as units of separation between the zones defined in this figure.  These cells will 
consist of a network IO cell, a security cell, and a physical IO cell. The physical IO cell  
will also include all utility functionality which is local to the RTU prototype, including 
debug outputs and hardware management.  This is the bulk of the untrusted computing 
base.   The security  cell  contains  the entirety of  the trusted computing base,  with the 
exception  of  the  operating  system kernel.   This  kernel  is  abstracted  from user-mode 
access,  but  for  architectural  purposes  can  be  visualized  as  a  separate  cell  running  a 
separate  thread.   The remainder  of  the  untrusted  computing  base  lies  in  the  network 
communication cell.   Although this  code is in the UTCB just as the physical IO, the 
network  and  physical  IO  reside  in  different  memory  spaces.   The  only  method  of 
transferring information and messages from physical IO to network IO (and vice versa) is 
through the security cell.  This is where the verifiable security of the prototype RTU is 





This chapter describes the implementation of the design described in Chapter III. 
This  will  include  an  overview of  the  hardware  selected,  and the  OKL4 development 
environment in Section 4.1, a description of the IO hardware and software in Section 4.2, 
and the  necessary implementation of  some utility  functions in  Section  4.3.   Network 
hardware  and  software  is  discussed  in  Section  4.4,  and  finally,  security  software 
descriptions  are  located  in  Section  4.5.   These  subsections  will  briefly  review  the 
architectural choices from Chapter III, then discuss the actual implementation, along with 
any necessary architectural changes.
4.1 Hardware, Build System, And Workflow
The primary hardware platform for this project is the Gumstix Verdex Pro XM4 
COM board.  The  Gumstix  platform is  a  simple,  embedded  computer  module  which 
includes an Intel Xscale PXA microprocessor, 64 megabytes of RAM, and 16 megabytes 
of flash memory. The module also includes  expansion connectors which are used general 
purpose  IO  (GPIO)  and  network  connectivity.  This  module  includes  a  PXA270 chip 
clocked  at  400MHz.  The  PXA270  is  a  32-bit  microcontroller  based  on  the  ARMv5 
architecture. Although dated (from 2007), the processor compares favorably to existing 
RTU devices. Datasheets and application manuals are commonly available from Marvell 
and Intel [37].
The Gumstix Platform was selected for its expandability and compatibility with 
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available OKL4 Distributions, as well as its similarity to existing RTU hardware. The 
OKL4 microkernel is currently targeted towards the cell phone and mobile device market. 
Although the PXA270 was designed principally as a mobile device chip, its specifications 
are not dissimilar from RTUs already on the market. This chip is compatible with both 
Linux and the OKL4 Development Environment,  allowing for testing in  a  real-world 
environment. 
Along with the Gumstix, the  console-VX and  netpro-VX expansion boards are 
used.  The  console-VX  provides  pin  headers  for  all  three  universal  asynchronous 
receiver/transmitters (UART) on the PXA270 Chip,  as well  as pin-headers for Audio, 
inter-IC Bus (I2C), and several GPIOs. The  netpro-VX includes an SMC9118  network 
PHY/MAC interface for network connectivity. 
In order to boot the Gumstix board, a bootloader (Uboot) resides in flash memory. 
The remainder of flash is utilized by the JFFS2 file system.  This file system is designed 
for flash storage, and in the gumstix environment, is pre-loaded with a Linux distribution. 
Uboot executes a startup script, which loads a program image from flash, microSD, or 
over the network into RAM, and then begins execution at that location. RAM begins at 
memory address 0xA2000000 and ends at address 0xA3F00000.  In order to properly 
boot the Gumstix board, an image must be loaded into memory in either ARM ELF or 
Intel Hex format. The factory default bootloader script has been modified for this project 
to load an image over the network, via TFTP, load it into RAM, and execute.
The OKL4 operating system used for this prototype is version 3.0.  The verified 
kernel which branches from the OKL4 project is based on version 3.0 of the operating 
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system.  The operating system is provided as a precompiled ELF file.  The devleopment 
kit includes a C and C++ compiler chain based on GCC.  This GCC compiler is modified 
to cross-compile for the ARM chip on the Gumstix board, and the SDK includes  Make 
files which abstract the inclusion of OKL4 Libraries and ElfWeaver calls. GCC and its 
linker produce output ELF files individually for each cell in the source tree structure. 
Each cell has associated XML files which define characteristics such as default priority, 
heap and stack sizes, and capabilities.  There are further XML files which describe the 
structure of  a complete  project,  and still  more XML files which define the hardware 
available on the development platform.  These XML files are used after the compilation 
process by the ElfWeaver tool.
The operation of the compiler and linker are unremarkable.  The OKL4 libraries 
included make use of basic kernel structures and system calls, and may be compiled into 
each cell independent of the kernel code.  Each cell is compiled as its own individual 
program.  Thus, the compilation tools and methods are independent of the OKL4 
operating system.  It is the ElfWeaver tool which manipulates these compiled ELF files in 
order to create a working OKL4 system. Elfweaver uses the XML files in order to 
determine the manner in which the resulting ELF files must be linked to the kernel. This 
linking takes place in an inside-out order. First, the compiled output files from GCC and 
its linker are combined with the per-cell XML file, relocating the memory space of the 
program, and making note of required cell characteristics such as capabilities, threads, 
memory sections, and other attributes. 
Next, the cells are linked to the kernel, with the kernel getting assigned memory sections 
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with low addresses, and cells coming in above that. Next, Elfweaver takes note of the 
earlier XML file specifications combined with a description of the machine architecture, 
and statically writes kernel memory to inform the kernel thread of the capabilities and 
permissions of each memory space, the location of hardware memory segments, as well 
as starting threads. This is how the final ELF file is generated. 
The  result  of  these  operations  is  a  single  ARM  ELF  file  which  contains  the 
operating system and user code.  This is loaded onto the RTU prototype using the trivial 
file transfer protocol (TFTP)  and  the bootloader mentioned previously.  The code then 
begins immediate execution.   The “debug” kernel mode is  used to provide additional 
information  on the working state of the system.  This includes a kernel debugger which 
can interrupt all running threads to provide state information.  Threads may invoke this 
debugger, which provides a simple mechanism to generate breakpoints while the program 
is running on the prototype hardware.
The prototype RTU must be physically connected to a serial port for debug, and 
utilizes  its  network  connection  for  loading  compiled  code.   In  order  to  facilitate 
development,  a  dedicated  machine  is  used  for  this  serial  debug  interface,  as  well  as 
compiling the code.   This machine also serves as a code repository, allowing multiple 
people  to  seamlessly  contribute  code  to  the  project,  and  synchronizing  development 
across several computers.
The  architecture  description  describes  the  logical  cell  breakdown.   The 
development tree is laid out in a similar fashion: Each cell resides in its own directory, 
with its own Make script and XML ElfWeaver description.   This XML tree is shown in 
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figure 4.1.   This make script is capable of compiling the files within the cell independent 
of  other cells.  Above all these cell directories lies a directory which contains a Make 
script and  a project description XML file.  This Make script recursively calls the Make 
scripts for each cell, then assembled the appropriate ElfWeaver calls, resulting in a single 
output ELF file.
As an example, the cell XML file for the network IO cell is as follows:
<okl4 priority="255" clists="256" file="access" 










The first line declares configuration set-points for the OKL4 operating system, such as 
thread priority, heap size, and arbitrary names by which the cell will be referred in the 
Elfweaver utility, and which must correspond to the output ELF file generated by the C 
compiler.  Under this declaration exist other declarations.  Among these, device tags tell 
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Figure 4.1: Hierarchy of ElfWeaver Compilation
the Elfweaver utility to search the machine.xml file for the memory space and interrupts 
which correspond to a given device name, and assign them to virtual memory with the 
cell.   Envrionment entrys with the keyword “cap” indicate capabilities to communicate 
with another cell.  These capabilities are given a location within the build tree (in this 
example, the “main” thread in the “security” cell), and a key to which these capabilities 
can be referred by the running thread.  This is a small example of the sort of declarations 
which can be made within cell-specific XML file.
In order to access specific hardware devices,  the running thread must have an 
awareness  of  how the  device-specific  memory  registers  get  mapped into  the  thread's 
virtual memory.  As code changes, these virtual memory locations may be moved around, 
although pages are always mapped in a one-to-one manner.  Although the start location of 
a given page of memory may change, locations within that page will  retain the same 
offset from the start of the virtualized page.  This code, from the physical IO cell, shows 






okl4_init_thread(); //this sets up okl4 lib, call for each thread















//Need these offsets, since OKL4 Page-aligns everything to the 
nearest
//Smallest page size (which is 0x1000).
IBMR = okl4_range_item_getbase(&i2c_virtmem)+ (okl4_word_t)0x680;
IDBR = okl4_range_item_getbase(&i2c_virtmem) + 
(okl4_word_t)0x688;
ICR = okl4_range_item_getbase(&i2c_virtmem) + (okl4_word_t)0x690;
ISR = okl4_range_item_getbase(&i2c_virtmem) + (okl4_word_t)0x698;
ISAR = okl4_range_item_getbase(&i2c_virtmem) + 
(okl4_word_t)0x6A0;
In the last block of code, virtual memory is assigned to global variables which represent 
device memory registers.  These are declared by finding a base memory location from the 
given virtual memory object, and applying an offset which is determined by the specific 
device, and can be found in the data sheet for the processor.  This process is repeated for 
each hardware device which a cell must implement.
4.2 IO Hardware And Software
While  the  Gumstix  is  a  powerful  and  versatile  computing  platform,  it  is  not 
suitable for directly generating the sort of digital and analog output typical of SCADA 
systems.  For this, the project requires additional hardware and interfacing software.  The 
existing digital IO utilizes 3.3v logic levels with no isolation.  With the exception of a 
sound  driver,  the  Gumstix  has  no  analog  operating  capability.   A survey  of  existing 
commercial RTUs shows a number of isolated nine volt digital IO, as well as analog in 
and analog out.  In order to safely generate this output, additional hardware is necessary.
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In order to provide flexibility in the selection of components, as well as reduce 
possible avenues of catastrophic failure, an I2C-based IO system was devised. The I2C 
bus is an Inter-IC communication bus, with many thousands of available peripherals in 
many thousands of configurations. The bus has a maximum speed of 400KHz, and can 
support up to 127 slave devices. Using an I2C based input/output system for the project 
had  multiple  advantages.  Changing  the  specifications  of  the  IO  no  longer  required 
retooling of complex analog components, and the PXA270. Rather, a cheap commodity 
IC could  be  replaced and some minor  code changes  made.  Furthermore,  GPIO were 
conserved, and the risk of destroying the PXA270 is greatly reduced as a result of placing 
the I2C chips between the PXA and the field components.
This  also  allows  for  the  simple  isolation  of  IO  software.  All  built-in  GPIO, 
including the IRQ lines, and GPIO function registers, exist in the same memory space. As 
a  result,  only  a  single  OKL4  cell  may  have  access  to  these  functions.  This  is  a 
disadvantage, as many hardware devices require interaction with these registers. The net 
result  would  be  requiring  the  IO  code  to  exist  in  the  same  execution  space  as  the 
utility/hardware manager.  The I2C memory space, however, exists as its own page. As a 
result,  the  architecture  of  the  prototype  as-written  can  more  closely  match  the  target 
architecture in meeting segmentation goals, allowing for a more verifiably secure device.
All  development and hardware build-out has been performed on a breadboard. 
Initial development of the I2C hardware was tested with an Arduino Microprocessing 
Environment. The Arduino is a simple, easy-to-use microcontroller development kit, with 
a simplified IDE. Although this device primarily targets the hobbyist market, it was useful 
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in this case to get development started quickly. Without a complex understanding of the 
OKL4  operating  system,  and  the  PXA270  chip,  the  IO  breakout  board  could  be 
completed and tested. The code generated to test the devices on this breadboard greatly 
sped up the process of transferring the IO code to the PXA platform.
The project as-built has eight analog inputs, two analog outputs, and eight digital 
IO spread across three chips. Without modification, all of these chips operate at the 3.3 
volts provided by the PXA270 and the Console-VX breakout board. The Serial Data and 
Serial Clock lines of the I2C bus must be pulled to a high logic level. Nominally, 4.7 
kOhm resistors are used. Steps must also be taken to minimize bus capacitance. With 
another layer of signal conditioning, these I/O can be easily converted into the 0-9v/0-
20mA signals needed for interaction with control devices. The chips were selected for 
their speed, accuracy, and availability. The digital IO chip used the Microchip 
MCP23009. This chip provides 8 GPIO at up to 400KHz.  The pinout of this chip is 
shown in figure 4.2
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Figure 4.2: Pinout of theMCP23009 Digital IO IC.
The analog output chips are both Microchip MCP4725.  Two are included, each  provides 
a single 12-bit DAC. The output is provided by a high-speed, high-accuracy resistor 
ladder.  The pinout of this chip is shown in figure 4.3.
The analog input chip  is the Analog Devices AD7997. This chip provides eight 10-bit 
analog inputs.  The pinout of this component is shown in figure 4.4.
These components are mounted on a breadboard, along with appropriate external 
passive  components  (such  as  decoupling  capacitors  and  pull  up  resistors).   This 
breadboard is connected to the console-VX breakout board, which includes standard pin 
headers for the I2C bus, as well as serial outputs.  The circuit diagram of all IO hardware 
is shown in figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.3: Pinout of the MCP4725 Analog Output IC.
Figure 4.4: Pinout of the AD7997 Analog Input IC.
As mentioned earlier, the bit-level interfacing for the IO hardware was initially 
developed using a simple 8-bit microcontroller platform.  Transferring this to the Gumstix 
required driver code for the I2C hardware of the Gumstix.  This peripheral device has two 
main operating modes: buffered and unbuffered.  While buffered mode provides greater 
reliability  in  an  environment  with  many  sensors  and  devices  operating  in  a  highly 
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Figure 4.5: Circuit Diagram for IO Hardware
threaded environment, unbuffered mode provides more direct access to the hardware.  In 
this mode, a single byte is loaded into a transmit register, the appropriate configuration 
bits are set, and the byte is shifted onto the communication media.  The configuration 
register is polled to determine the transmission status of the data.  In the case of all the 
hardware described above, no data transmission requires more than three bytes of data, to 
either receive or transmit a given piece of data.
The I2C bus operates a clock speed for 400khz, with a single acknowledge bit to 
each byte of data, and a single address byte for each transmission of data.  This results in 
a maximal channel bandwidth of 44 kilobits per second. For the purpose of the prototype, 
this is an acceptable method for generating IO.  
The driving software for the I2C peripheral controller was simply generated.  The 
major hurdle through this part of development was the discovery of clock distribution and 
power saving hardware within the Gumstix processor.  This hardware shut down non-
critical systems by default in order to save power.  This was only discovered after sifting 
through the Linux driver for the I2C peripheral on the Gumstix board.  The functionality 
required to  initialize the I2C peripheral was added to the  utility functions described in 
Section 4.3.
4.3 Utility Functionality
For the purposes of development, utility functionality includes any functionality 
which  is  not  specifically  related  to  the  task  of  accepting  control  input  from  a 
communication device (in this case, Ethernet), and generating output through a security 
layer.  The OKL4 microkernel takes care of the large part of this debug functionality. 
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Unfortunately, some additional features are required specific to this hardware and target 
architecture  which  necessitate  additional  utility  threads.   During  development,  these 
threads consist of a hardware manager, and a serial debug thread.
4.3.1 Hardware Management
During the architectural planning phase, it was discovered that the memory layout 
of the Gumstix processor would require a hardware manager in order to facilitate the 
configuration of  various peripherals on the gumstix board, including the I2C hardware, 
the network hardware, timer functionality, and serial ports.  This could not be done by the 
individual cells due to the complexities of mapping memory into each cell on a read/write 
basis.  Such a mapping is not only difficult to implement under OKL4, but it undermines 
the principals of separation which allow such a device to remain secure.  The mechanisms 
of IPC within the OKL4 operating system allow us operate this hardware from a separate 
thread and memory space.  The original design placed the hardware management thread 
within its own cell,  for even stronger segmentation.   Unfortunately,  bugs in the build 
system rendered  this  solution  untenable.   The  total  number  of  cells  in  the  operating 
environment is limited by errors in the memory allocation subsystem of the Elfweaver 
program.  As a result, the hardware management functionality is placed in the untrusted 
computing base, in the same memory space as the physical IO.  This is not a critical 
architectural change, and does not affect the security or performance features of the RTU. 
The IPC calls required are abstracted by the libraries.  The function call do not behave 
differently based on the locality of the memory space to which the communication is 
destined.
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Thus,  the  operation  and  implementation  of  the  hardware  management  cell  is 
simple.  The hardware manager alters some configuration registers according to the needs 
of  the  remote  cell.   This  alteration  is  statically  defined– the  cell  which  requires  this 
notification cannot request specific changes in system state.  The remote threads simply 
wait until they are given a message.  This message is sent after all hardware has been 
initialized.  In reality, these messages are not sent concurrently, and if they are not sent in 
a specifically calculated order, race conditions could result.  For prototyping purposes, 
these race conditions are avoided by inserting calculated execution delays prior to thread 
operation.  This allows for simple insertion and removal of test frameworks.
4.3.2. Serial Debug
The need for serial debug was immediately apparent after some initial tests and 
research  into  the  operation  of  the  OKL4 microkernel.   The  existing  kernel  debugger 
operated alongside the stdout structure in the development environment.  This required 
the assignment of a serial device to a specific and single cell.  Although this is useful for 
debugging  a  single  thread,  in  many  instances  the  interaction  of  threads  and  the 
communications between them was the interesting subject of debugging.   In order to 
generate usefully verbose output from more than one cell, messages would be passed to a 
central thread which would implement and use the serial device.  IPC calls will pass the 
desired ASCII data to the serial debug cell, which will be printed to the terminal, along 
with the originating cell name.
The  implementation  of  such functionality  is  simple.   ASCII  message  must  fit 
within a single IPC call, and are thus limited to approximately 160 bytes.  The client 
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thread must first call an initialization function which declares the cell's name in a human 
readable format.  A new function, lprintf, is written which implements vnsprintf 
to generate a string output based on a variable argument input.  This output byte string is 
then passed to the serial debug cell.  The serial debug cell receives this communication, 
and displays the message along with the previously declared thread name.
From the client cell, the calls are blocking.  As a result, output to the debug cell is 
guaranteed.  If the debug cell is in the process of printing data from another thread, the 
second thread simply waits until the debug cell is able to process the request.  While this 
results in decreased performance for cells printing data, this is not critical.  An operational 
device would not include such debug functionality.
4.4 Network IO
Network IO is a critical component of the RTU, providing greater connectivity 
which allows for the demonstration of the security and performance capabilities described 
herein.  The Gumstix board includes a network device based on the SMC9118 chipset. 
This chipset provides access to the physical and MAC network layers.  All other layers of 
communication must be implemented in software.  This network device is designed for 
high throughput performance in a  monolithic kernel  operating system such as real-time 
Linux.  As a result, the hardware includes faculties for deep packet buffers and interrupt 
based  functionality.   For  the  development  of  the  prototype,  these  high  performance 
features  are  toilsome  rather  than  helpful.   Unfortunately,  the  existing  device  drivers 
implement the complete feature set of capability included for this hardware.
In order to boost progress, the least comprehensive drivers available were used in 
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the development of the RTU software.  These drivers are derived from a dated version of 
the  Uboot  bootloader.   This  program is  normally  used  as  a  minimal  bootloader  for 
embedded systems.  In fact, the Gumstix itself loads boot code from a newer version of 
this software package.  This device driver is neatly stratified into layers which support 
raw Ethernet frames, and higher level program structures which implement TCP/IP, UDP 
and other standard protocols.  This is beneficial to development of the prototype RTU, as 
we have principal need of a driver stack which implements hardware drivers to send and 
receive Ethernet frames.
Although  the  uboot  drivers  operate  in  privileged  mode  in  their  native 
environment,  the  page  structure  of  the  physical  memory  associate  with  the  network 
device allows seamless virtualization of the physical memory with minimal modification. 
This  memory becomes an offset  subsection  inside the  thread's  virtual  memory space. 
Other changes are more endemic to the structure of the driver.  The uboot code operates 
in an interrupt driven mode, and maintains a sense of statefulness between packets.  In 
order to minimize points of failure while modifying the driver, both of these features are 
undesirable.  It is necessary to remove the interrupt drive structures, and circumvent the 
packet buffers built into the driver code.  This results in no net performance detriment 
when implementing the simplified SCADA protocol described in Section 3.4, as the data 
throughput during testing is not large enough to necessitate such buffers.
In order to change from interrupt driven mode to polled mode, each piece of code 
which  would  block  for  an  impending  interrupt  would  instead  inspect  configuration 
registers in an endless loop.  Throughout these changes, it is necessary to remain vigilant 
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of memory which must be declared volatile.  In order to circumvent the packet buffers, 
the  packet  reception  code,  which  would  rotate  through  these  memory  locations  in  a 
round-robin fashion instead simply deposits all data in the first buffer.  Data must be read 
from  this  buffer  as  soon  as  it  is  made  available.  This  is  not  appropriate  for  high-
throughput links, but this has no effect on the performance of the prototype RTU.
Following these modifications, it  was possible to send and receive raw unicast 
Ethernet frames. In order to interface with more complex systems, some basic network 
layers must be implemented at a higher level.  In order to establish socket connections 
with  Windows  and  Linux  machines,  it  is  necessary  to  implement  address  resolution 
protocol (ARP), a standard protocol which allows IP addresses to be associate with MAC 
addresses in the link-local context.  In order to deliver data in a more standards compliant 
manner, UDP is preferred due to the simplicity of implementation.
The micro-IP project is a comprehensive source of networking code designed for 
small real-time systems.  The basic micro-IP stack includes an implementation of ARP, 
Ping and UDP.  With careful efforts, this stack was modified to operate within the OKL4 
operating system, utilizing the send and receive primitives of the polled-mode network 
driver.  Unfortunately, the network driver as-implemented does not support addressing by 
means of multicast MAC addresses.  In order to reduce network traffic on large local area 
networks, many implementations of ARP will only request responses via a specified local 
multicast address.  As a result, the prototype RTU cannot respond to ARP request of this 
nature.  In order to circumvent this issue, the prototype generates gratuitous, unrequested 
ARP responses.  The responses are discovered by the link-local network devices, and 
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retained for a short period of time (5-15 minutes).  The UDP implementation does not pay 
attention to checksum or header information, excepting that all data must fit within a 
single Ethernet frame (including IP overhead).
Once a packet is received by the prototype RTU, it is inspected for utility.  If it is 
an ARP or a Ping packet, it is immediately acted upon, and the network IO thread reenters 
a packet wait state.  If the packet is UDP, it must be addressed to the correct port (1200, 
chosen arbitrarily, from Section 3.4).  User code then inspect the packet for the proper 
formatting, according to the simple SCADA protocol specification in Section 3.4.  If the 
request is properly formatted, the packet is passed up to security code as IPC.  Security 
code processes this request, and informs the network code of the proper response.  If the 
proper response if no response, the network code again enters a wait state.  If the proper 
response is a packet, the packet is generated and transmitted.  The UDP layer generates 
the UDP and IP header, as well as any necessary checksums.
4.5 Security Cell
The Security Cell  is the only portion of code which may transmit information 
between the physical IO and the network IO.  This layer must ensure that the network IO 
can be trusted, and is authorized to perform as commanded.  This layer is the only portion 
of code which must be trusted to some degree.  All other code (with the exception of the 
kernel) may be untrusted.  Furthermore, operations performed by SCADA systems are 
time  sensitive.   While  the  project  need  not  conform  to  strictly  deterministic  timing 
requirements, the performance must not be unsuitable for any SCADA application.  The 
security cell must therefore be designed and written with an eye towards transparency, 
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verifiability, and speed.  In further pursuit of these goals, the security cell maintains no 
permissions to any hardware faculties, apart from RAM. In all cases, less code is better 
than more code.
Aside from passing message between the physical and network IO, the security 
cell has two main functions: performing the necessary network authentication required to 
trust the client messages, and perform role based access control to ensure that the remote 
user has permission to perform the operations desired.  While these two functionalities 
are related, they are functionally independent.  As implemented, all functions are highly 
layered, with data passing between layers, allowing additional functionality, or alteration 
of functionality at every level.
Data enters the security cell through the network IO cell.  The network IO cell 
delivers the simple SCADA contents of the incoming packet to the security cell in an IPC 
message.  If the security cell  is currently preoccupied processing another request, the 
incoming request is denied.  No response is sent to the remote machine.  This minimizes 
the amount of time spent in a state which cannot receive packets.  This is a deliberate 
decision to mitigate the risk of denial of service attacks.  The security cell firsts passes 
this  message  into  a  layer  which  determines  whether  it  is  necessary  to  demand  an 
authentication handshake with the client.  Currently, necessity is determined based on a 
set list of “critical points.”  If any user attempts to perform any operation on a critical 
point,  handshaking  authentication  is  demanded.   This  logic  is  easily  expandable  to 
include other system states.  If this handshaking is necessary, the operation is placed on a 
one-deep  queue,  and  the  process  of  authenticating  the  client  is  performed.   If  this 
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handshaking  is  performed  successfully,  the  operation  is  passed  up  to  the  role  based 
authentication layer.  If handshaking is unsuccessful, the operation is not passed up.
Next, if authentication is successful, or no authentication is necessary, the packet 
is passed up to the role based authentication layer.  This consists of a single monolithic 
function which compares the desired operation and associate user, combined with current 
system state, with the role based authentication policy.  If this operation is allowed by role 
based authentication controls, then it is passed to the physical IO cell.  If the operation 
necessitates a response, the security cell waits for the response, and passes it back to the 
network IO cell.  This is the entire operation  of the security cell.
If handshaking is necessary, the operation is placed on a one-deep queue.  The 
security cell then generates a server nonce value.  This nonce value is transmitted to the 
network IO cell.  The network IO cell formats this into a demand-response packet, and 
transmits to the client.  The client must generate its own nonce, and perform a SHA-256 
hash of the server nonce, the client nonce, and a pre-shared secret.  The client nonce and 
the first 4 bytes of the calculated SHA-256 hash are transmitted back to the server.  Upon 
reception, the network IO cell transmits this information to the security cell.  The security 
cell then generates its own SHA-256 hash based on server nonce, client nonce, and pre-
shared secret.  If the first 4 bytes are identical the authentication is successful and the 
queued packet is passed to the role based authentication layer.  If the authentication is not 
successful, the queued operation is simply ignored.  No response is sent to the client 
regarding the success or failure of the operation.
The next step taken by the prospective operation is then subject to the role based 
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access  control  layer.   The role  based access controls  are  programmed statically  (hard 
coded) for simplicity  and speed.  The functions which make use of these controls are 
agnostic to the source of access control data.  Expanding on the descriptions from section 
3.7,  points  represent  physical  IO  or  system state.   Points  have  a  unique  ID,  and an 
associated point type.  This point type is an arbitrary descriptor with no programmatic 
meaning.  Permissions are a combination of a point and an operation.  Operations are 
coded as bit fields in order to allow easy inspection by logic operations.  (For example, 
read is 0x01,  operate is 0x02  and select is 0x04.  A logical AND operation can easily 
mask out desired operations.)
Roles are buit of permissions, combined with point type controls, and permission 
access  constraints,  along with a  unique  role  ID.   Point  type  controls  exist  as  unique 
bitmasks, similar to operations within permissions.  These point types indicated which 
points may be manipulated, regardless of permissions.  For example, a role might have 
permission to read and operate on point three, but point three is of point type two, and 
this role does not have access to point type two.  As a result, no operations are allowed,  
despite  permissions.   This  allows  for  larger  redefinition  of  points  without  altering 
individual  permissions.   Permission  access  constraints  are  descriptors  which  consider 
system state when allowing a role access to its permissions.  Although Hieb's description 
of  an  RTU  based  RBAC  configuration  includes  consideration  for  many  types  of 
permission access constraints,  the prototype RTU only considers constraints  based on 
time of day and day of week.  Hieb also adds constraints based on location within factory, 
location of terminal, and the data payload of the operation.
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Users are the highest level construct in this hierarchy.  Users contain information 
about roles, as well as unique pre-shared secrets (used in the authentication step described 
above), and permission access constraints.  Role access constraints are logically identical 
to the permission access constraints described above, but instead  limit a users ability to 
access roles.  Role ID numbers are assigned in a bitmask fashion, as described above.  As 
a result, a user may have access to multiple roles.  If any single role gives a user access to  
a point, the user is allowed to perform the permitted operation on the given point, even if 
another role would result in  failed permissions.
In order to determine access for a given incoming operation, access controls are 
inspected in order of granularity.  First, the incoming user is inspected for membership to 
any role.  If the user has an associated role, this role is inspected for access to the given 
point.  The role is then inspected for point type access.  If the role has access to the given  
point type, its associated permission is inspected for access to the desired operation.  If 
the  permission  has  access  to  the  desired  operation,  role  access  constraints  are  then 
inspected.  If no role access constraint prevents  access, permission access constraints are 
inspected.  If no permission access constrains prevent access, the operation is allowed to 
proceed. Failures at any level in this hierarchy prevent continuation into higher levels of 
inspection.   As a result,  failed access is the fastest  possible operation.   This prevents 
bogus requests from occupying too much processing time in the security cell.
If  permission is  granted,  the  data  is  then  passed  into  the  physical  IO cell  for 
further processing.  If permission is not granted, the security cell and network cell re-




After implementing the basic role based access controls, testing was carried out in 
order  to  determine  the  performance  overhead of  the  implementation  of  such  an 
architecture.   This  testing  provides  a  baseline  level  of  performance  which  could  be 
improved and optimized.  The intent was to develop an understanding of the performance 
of a device which security enhancements based on the isolation of threads and memory 
spaces.  Section 5.1 will provide and overview of the test goals and constraints, Section 
5.2 will  describe the test   methodologies,  Section 5.3 will  review initial  performance 
tests,  and  Section  5.4  will  detail  the  performance  testing  of  the  entire  software 
configuration.
5.1 Test Goals And Constraints
This performance testing  was designed to provide an overview of the overhead 
that should be expected when implementing the security architecture as built.  It was not 
intended to certify or verify the prototype or the architecture's suitability for a specific 
control system application.
In general, it is desirable to spend a minimum amount of time performing security 
operations.  It is not so critical for timing to remain consistent across points.  It is also not 
critical  for  all  points  to  remain  constant  in  response  time.   Initial  performance 
measurements  were taken between the network IO cell and the physical IO cell, with a 
dummy cell in the middle, playing the role of  the security cell.  This provides a baseline 
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level of performance which will allow for insight into the specific time overhead of the 
security operations.  In this initial testing, the dummy “security” cell merely passes the 
messages on to the physical IO cell, without any modification or inspection.  The time 
overhead required for this operation consists of the time required to inspect the incoming 
packet, pass the data to the security cell via IPC, combined with the time required to pass 
this IPC through the security cell, to physical IO, and for the physical IO to return via the 
same path.  Testing for this phase measured performance based on digital operation, an 
analog read,  or  and analog write,  due to the differing amounts  of data,  and different 
software  drivers  required  to  manipulate  each of  these  physical  IO components.   The 
SCADA protocol described in Chapter IV was further simplified in order to eliminate as 
many variables as possible.  Messages were injected into raw Ethernet packets, without 
the overhead of a UDP protocol stack.  For testing, the RTU did not perform verification 
or inspection of packet contents.
Further testing probed the performance penalties imposed by the SCADA protocol 
processing and security features.  These measurements focused primarily on the end-to-
end performance of the device, without consideration for outside factors such as client 
code, or network conditions.  The important timing data is the time between the reception 
of a request and the response sent.  Testing for this phase will cover a broad region of 
possibilities, in order to explore possible bottlenecks.  Considerations were made for the 
acquisition of time data for the challenge-handshake authentication, as well as the role 
based access control.  Due to the nature of the RBAC algorithm used for the prototype 
RTU, different points respond in differing amounts of time depending on which user and 
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which role  is  accessing  the  given point.   The  timing  data  for  failed  requests  is also 
considered.
5.2 Test Methodologies
Performance testing as  described above takes place within the software of  the 
RTU.  In order to generate this timing data, a stable time base which remains consistent 
across cells will be required.  The Gumstix processor has multiple counter peripherals. 
The OKL4 operating system makes use of one of these timing  peripherals in order to 
handle  operating  system  tasks  such  as  context  switches  and  IPC.   The  other  timer 
peripheral  is  unused.   In  order  to  track  timing  across  multiple  cells  and  in  multiple 
situations,  the  memory  space  assigned  to  this  timer  peripheral  must  be  mapped  into 
multiple cells simultaneously.  This is impossible in to do if both cells must have read-
write access to the memory segment in question.  Fortunately, it is possible to map the 
same memory segment into a single cell in a read-only fashion.  In order to make use of 
the timer, it is only necessary to read the current state of the timer.  Although other timer 
features are useful, for the purposes of generating performance results, this will suffice. 
The remaining timer is configured by the hardware manager as a 3.25 MHz free-
running 32-bit counter.  The counter timebase is generated from the main CPU clock, 
which is driven by a 13MHz crystal oscillator, which is fed into a PLL circuit which 
multiplies the input frequency to a CPU clock of 416 MHz.  The total error in this system 
is +/- 50PPM, amounting to +/- 50 microseconds over a one second measurement. A 3.25 
MHz  free-running  counter  which  increments  a  32-bit  register  results  in  a  maximum 
timebase of approximately 22 minutes without overflowing.  There is a slight chance of 
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overflow  when  simply  observing   the  before-and-after  state  of  the  counter.   As  the 
timebase of measurement  is  very small  compared to the full  range of measurements, 
overrun data will appear be calculated as negative.  These negative measurements will 
simply be discarded if they appear.
A single  inline  function  was written  to  make  note  of  the  timer  value  at  the 
beginning and end of the testing period. This inline function simply writes the value of 
the timer to a local variable.  After the timer is read, the amount of time can be calculated  
without worry of altering the results.  Creating this function as a C Code inline insures 
that it is compiled without requiring the use of the stack pointer, reducing the required 
CPU overhead.   In  the  ARM architecture,  this  function  compiles  to   three  assembly 
instructions, requiring 12 cycles of execution at 400 MHz.  This is below the minimum 
time increment detectable on the prototype RTU.
During the testing process, all serial output was disabled.  The design of the serial 
output in both the kernel debugger, as well as the included serial debug cell require bits to 
be  loaded sequentially  into a shift register.  As a result, generating serial IO requires a 
large number of CPU cycles, because the speed of serial output is a mere 19200 bits per 
second.  Additionally, it is necessary for any non-running tasks to cede processing time as 
early as possible.  For example, the hardware management cell should cease execution 
immediately following the configuration of peripherals. Failure to cede unused CPU time 
to  time-critical  processes  could  lead  to  as  much  as  a  third  of  the  CPU  time  doing 
absolutely nothing.  In implementation, C preprocessor defines are used to enable and 
disable these features at compile time, as this code is necessary for debugging.
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Initial  performance  test  measured the  performance  from  the  reception  of  an 
incoming packet to the response packet.  This considers the time spent reading the packet, 
sending  the  message  through  two  IPC  links,  generating  the  appropriate  IO,  and 
responding.  This provided a baseline level of performance for I2C IO operations, as well 
as IPC messages between cells.
Additional performance data was measured from the reception of a packet to the 
response packet.  This  considers the decoding of the UDP payload, IPC between cells, 
security operations, and generating IO.  This  was performed using a set of test users. 
These users have access to between zero and two simultaneous roles, and have different 
associated role  and  permission  access  constraints.   Performance  of the  handshaking 
algorithm was measured  as well.  For handshaking, only the time spend processing the 
request on the RTU  was considered.   The time required for the client to generate  an 
appropriate response is not considered as part  of a performance test  for the prototype 
RTU.
5.3 Initial Performance Measurements
Hieb showed that performance could be as good as 65 microseconds for an IPC 
request.[35]  This high level of IPC performance on a similar platform implies that it 
should not be impossible to implement an RTU using verified IPC calls of such speed. 
Hieb's example, however, was reduced in scope and complexity compared to what would 
be required for a complete RTU.  In order to properly simulate the calls necessary to 
implement a functional RTU prototype, IPC is routed through multiple cells, and used to 
generate a physical IO response before responding to the original cell.
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For the purposes of initial performance measurement, IPC was routed from the 
network IO cell, through a dummy cell, into the physical IO cell.  During this test, the 
performance  of  security  algorithms  was  not  considered.   This   test  displayed  the 
performance of the OKL4 operating system in an architecture similar to that defined in 
Chapter  3,  establishing  a  baseline of  performance on top  of  which security  could be 
added.
The IPC message passing is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Initial results  were  several  orders  of  magnitude  different from  the  results 
discovered by Hieb in 2008.  The time required by the IPC routines (represented in figure 
5.1  as  t 1 and  t 3 )  consists  of  95-98  percent  of  the  total  time  required  for  the 
operation.   This  was suspicious,  as  the  complexity  of  the  software  tested  was not 
significantly greater than that tested by Hieb in 2008 [35].  Investigation provided a great 
deal of insight into the operation of the OKL4 operating system, and revealed that these 
71
Figure 5.1: IPC Communications Testing Paths
performance measures were invalid.  An errant thread (operating the hardware manager, 
in this case) failed to cede its CPU time after its critical operations had been completed, 
resulting in large delays while the hardware manager utilized the CPU by idling.  Fixing 
this issue required major changes in the architecture of the utility functionality.  These 
changes are reflected by the results in Table 5.1
Table 5.1: IPC Performance measurements






Value Units Value Units Value Units
I2C + 
IPC
Mean Time 533.65 µs 334.39 µs 441.66 µs
St. Deviation 3.12 µs 2.41 µs 3.03 µs
N 999 999 999
Max 553.85 µs 344.92 µs 458.77 µs
Min 528.92 µs 329.75 µs 436.62 µs
I2C
Mean Time 503.46 µs 304.24 µs 411.39 µs
St. Deviation 2.88 µs 2.32 µs 2.58 µs
N 999 999 999
Max 520.92 µs 314.15 µs 421.85 µs




With the removal  of the errant  thread,  which utilized a  large number of CPU 
cycles, the IPC performance was vastly improved, with round-trip results on the order of 
30 µs.  Considering the time required to generate the physical IO, IPC overhead accounts 
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for a mere five to ten percent of total required overhead.  This performance is well within 
the time performance requirements of many SCADA system applications.
5.4 Security Feature Performance Measurements
Following the initial performance measurements, which show the capabilities of 
the OKL4 operating system in the context of the target architecture, the security layer was 
developed  and  inserter  between  the  network  IO  and  the  physical  IO.   Although  the 
security  layer  is  designed  to  minimize  performance  penalties,  the  many  checks  and 
parsing layers imposed by the system as developed in chapter IV imparts a delay in the 
passing of messages.  It should be noted that the performance results described herein do 
not include any amount of optimization beyond what is described in chapter 4.  In order 
to gain adequate insight into the operation of this cell, several outside cases were tested.
The testing is performed in the same manner as described in figure 5.1, with the 
dummy cell replaced by the actual security code.  The communications which take place 
between the network IO, security, and physical IO processes is described more fully in 
Chapter III.  The performance measurement is taken from the moment of packet receipt to 
the moment of reply packet transmission.  If no packet is to be transmitted to the remote 
host, the end point of time measurement is taken as the moment the network IO cell re-
enters  a  wait  state,  awaiting  the  reception  of  new  packets.   This  performance 
measurement  considers the  overhead  of  parsing  and  generating  UDP  packets, 
disassembling  the  data  payload  and  forwarding  the  message  to  the  security  layer, 
performing  any  necessary  security  operations,  generating  the  physical  IO  and/or 
generating a response.  This method of testing deconvolutes the potential network delays 
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from the performance of the RTU hardware.
Four test cases are used in this test measurement.  User  one is used for the test 
cases involving operations which are permitted to occur.  Due to the ordering of roles and 
users within the security data structures, user  one must undergo the maximal possible 
number of inspections and iterations in order to generate a “permission granted” response. 
For tests involving operations which are not permitted, user five is utilized.  User fivve 
has no permissions to any point or operation, and due to its placement in the security data 
structures, undergoes the maximal possible number of inspections and iterations for an 
operation which is not permitted.
The test cases used are user one reading and writing to point one, user one reading 
point  two,  and user  five reading point  one.   Point  one  does  not  require  handshaking 
authentication,  and  is  placed  as  an  outside  case  among  point  which  do  not  require 
handshaking authentication, while point two is an outside case of points which do require 
handshaking authentication.  In order to properly test the time required to generate and 
verify a challenge-handshake demand and response conversation, the time required from 
the original request to the authentication demand is summed with the time required from 
the reception of the response to the transmission of the operation response.  The removes 
from consideration  the  amount  of  time required  for  the  client  to  receive  a  challenge 
request and reply appropriately.
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Average 44.98 ms 44.99 ms 67.34 ms 22.36 ms
St. Deviation 0.35 ms 0.33 ms 0.33 ms 0.28 ms
N 1000 1000 1000 1000
Min 45.22 ms 45.23 ms 67.852 ms 22.54 ms
Max 40.49 ms 43.09 ms 66.69 ms 21.61 ms
Pursuant to design goals, user five experiences a minimal delay from request to 
response,  corresponding  with  the  very  fast  denial  of  permission  associated  with  the 
design of the security cell.  Predictably, access to point two, which requires handshaking 
authentication, requires more time than access to point one.  As points one and two take 
approximately the same number of inspections and iterations to work through the role 
based access control system, these results show that the handshaking algorithm imposes 
an  additional  delay  of  approximately  23  milliseconds.   The  representative  numbers 
summarized in table 5.3 are acceptable for a wide variety of SCADA applications.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis presented an overview of the design, implementation, and testing of a 
prototype  based on a  new security  architecture  for  remote  terminal  units  attached to 
SCADA systems. Using the OKL4 microkernel operating system, it is now possible to 
implement this architecture in hardware, and begin to perform security and performance 
testing  on  this  prototype  device.   The  preceding  chapters  have  detailed  this  process. 
Section 6.1 will summarize the procedures and findings in this prototype development, 
while  Section  6.2  will  briefly  discuss  possible  future  directions  to  this  line  of 
development.
6.1 Summary Of Results
The architecture developed by Hieb and Graham [33] is uniquely applicable to 
RTU  control  devices  and  similar  industrial  embedded  systems.   This  architecture 
separates the physical IO from the communications layers with a security piece which 
provides trusted isolation.  Monolithic kernels cannot provide this trusted isolation, due to 
their architecture.  The architecture of the microkernel lends itself to this development 
very well by providing a minimal basis upon which a secure system can be built.  The 
security  pieces  of  the  target  architecture  aim  for  minimal  interaction  with  untrusted 
pieces, which can be provided through a microkernel.  This minimization of the security 
components simplify the procedure of formal verification, which requires an operating 
system which can be objectively trusted.
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Fortunately, the OKL4 operating system has  reportedly undergone the rigors of 
formal verification, providing an ideal microkernel platform upon which such a system 
can be developed.  The verified kernel discussed in Chapter II is not yet commercially 
available, though this piece can easily be replaced. The verified version of the kernel is 
almost identically similar in code-base and operation [29].  The basic libraries used to 
build the prototype device have not yet withstood the rigors of formal verification, but the 
task of building a minimal library necessary to implement the trusted features of this 
device  is  trivial  compared  to  the  implementation  and  verification  of  a  specific 
construction of the target architecture.
This OKL4 microkernel operates on modern hardware which is not dissimilar to 
hardware being used for commercial RTU devices today.  As a result, this prototype can 
be built with reasonable similarities to existing control devices, with the added benefits of 
the proposed security architecture.
The actual implementation of the prototype closely follows the target architecture, 
with some shifting of utility functionality within the untrusted components of the system. 
The memory management architecture of the OKL4 operating system requires the careful 
placement of utility functionality in order to maintain the separability requirements of a 
secure industrial system. Minor issues in the Elfweaver tool have reduced options for 
placement of utility functionality for the purposes of building a prototype,  but this  is 
neither a permanent issue, nor one endemic to the concept. This prototype makes use of 
commodity hardware for both computational power and the generation of physical IO. 
Throughout  the development,  effort  and care was taken to minimize contact  between 
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cells,  and  simplify  the  costly  inter-process  communications  (IPC)  calls  which  have 
plagued microkernel operating systems in the past.  The net result is a prototype which 
closely  follows  the  target  architecture,  implemented  with  the  OKL4  microkernel 
operating system, paired with commodity hardware.  The device created is not dissimilar 
from existing RTU devices, and can be used to judge performance, security and feasibility 
of the proposed architecture when applied to real hardware with one example of a secure 
microkernel based operating system.
During basic performance testing of the prototype device, as described in Chapter 
V,  the  results  are  acceptable  for  a  wide  variety  of  SCADA applications.   The  IPC 
interactions and IO hardware require on the order of 500 microseconds to perform their 
duties, while the security layer imposes a delay between 20 and 100 milliseconds.  These 
tests have sought to eliminate external interference, and solely represent the time required 
by the prototype software. The device meets a basic level of performance necessary to 
move on to more complex testing and development of security and performance features 
within the target architecture.
6.2 Future Directions
The development of a security architecture and prototype which can achieve an 
objective degree of security opens up a realm of many possibilities.  Moving forward, it  
will become necessary to perform additional testing with the devices in a simulated plant 
environment,  for  a  more  complete  understanding  of  performance.   This  can  also  be 
extended into the control of a real plant, utilizing commodity control devices in a larger 
control  network.   This  will  require  the  implementation  of  industry  standard  SCADA 
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communications protocols,  implementing the role based access control features of the 
prototype device.
Additional  development  and  testing  could  explore  the  use  of  the  device  as  a 
security layer in an existing SCADA network.  In this  case,  the security layer would 
remain unchanged, while a network IO layer resides on either side of the security layer. 
One network interface would be exposed to the larger “untrusted” network of control 
devices, while the second network interface would connect directly to an existing control 
device, allowing for the retrofitting of verifiable security into networks of existing, legacy 
control devices.
Currently, the prototype firmware is loaded directly into RAM on the flash device. 
While this is useful for development, future prototypes may choose to optimize long term 
performance  by  placing  firmware  on  the  Gumstix's  built  in  flash,  or  implementing 
execution-in-place  from a  secure  digital  memory  card.   This  memory  card  adds  the 
benefit  of being field replaceable,  resulting in a  device which can easily  be updated, 
without compromising network security with “over-the-air” update features.
While  the  OKL4 team has  reached a  major  milestone  in  formally  verifying  a 
kernel, there are many additional avenues of research which must be followed before the 
OKL4 “system” can lay claim to total verification.  The verified kernel makes two basic 
assumptions:  The compiler is trustworthy, and the hardware performs deterministically. 
Although some initial research has been performed in the area of compiler verification, 
no verified compiler yet exists.  As the OKL4 operating system is written in standard C, a  
minimal verified compiler will compile the OKL4 operating system.  The Elfweaver tool 
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is  another  component  of  the  compilation  stack  which  has  not  been  verified.   As  an 
integral  part  of  the  OKL4 build  system,  it  must  be a  trusted  component.   The  most  
difficult assumption to follow through the path of verification, however, is the hardware. 
The microprocessor, and particularly the memory management unit (MMU) must behave 
precisely as designed in order for the verified software pieces to achieve trustworthiness.
Following further performance testing, security testing utilizing a broad range of 
possible  attack  vectors  will  verify  the  architecture  fundamentally,  as  well  as  its 
implementation.   With the use of a  formally verified kernel,  the eventual  goal of the 
architecture and its prototype should be to achieve a similar level of formal verification. 
This  process  is  uniquely  cumbersome,   especially when  using  the  unverified  kernel 
derivative,  with  unverified  libraries.    While  replacement  of  these  components  with 
verified analogs is eventually necessary, the first steps of verification can begin before 
this point.  Performing attacks is simply one step in this process which should provide 
high-level feedback about the implementation of the architecture.
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Section 1 – Introduction
This laboratory manual will serve as an introduction to the prototype hardware 
and firmware for the security hardened remote terminal unit for SCADA systems.  This 
provides a “state of the project” type of overview, and is not meant to outline any strict 
rules which must be adhered to.  Rather, this document should serve as a reference to the 
state of the build tools as of Spring 2011.  All information is subject to change, and if it is  
developmentally convenient to effect such a change, it would be wise to deprecate any 
information contained herein.  Section 2 will provide an overview of the hardware used, 
including the custom IO hardware assembled for the prototype.  Section 3 will provide 
configuration details for the OKL4 build system.  Section 4 contains a short overview of 
the code versioning software used for tracking this project.
All  the  information  contained  herein  is  accurate  to  April,  2011.   With  the 
exception  of  the  version  of  the  OKL4  operating  system  used,  all  other  information 
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contained in this document is freely mutable.  This document is intended to provide a 
brief  introduction to  the systems used in  the past and present  of this  project,  so that 
informed choices may be made regarding future development.
Before reading this manual, it is assumed that the reader has a basic understanding 
of the C programming language,  and has previously read the Summer and Fall  2010 
progress reports, as well as “A Security Hardened Field Device for SCADA Systems.” 
This document expands and extends on the information presented previously.  More detail 
on  various  progression  caveats  and  stumbling  blocks  may  be  found  in  those 
aforementioned documents.
Section 2 – Hardware
There are two primary components to the hardware  used in the development of 
the  prototype  RTU.   The  Gumstix  boards  and  associated  accessories  are  commercial 
development tools which provide an out-of-box turnkey solution for ARM development. 
Although these tools are intended for embedded Linux development, the OKL4 operating 
system supports the Gumstix hardware out-of-the-box.  The second major component is 
the  in  house  developed  IO  hardware.   This  IO  hardware  generates  IO  signals  not 
dissimilar from existing commercial devices.  The Gumstix board is unable to generate 
analog IO out of box, and the additional hardware provides a further separation layer for 
IO, in both software and firmware.  Should the custom IO hardware fail, it is unlikely to 
also destroy the more expensive Gumstix board.
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Section 2.1 – Gumstix
The Gumstix board is  the basis  of the prototype RTU.  This board contains  a 
400MHz ARM Xscale processor, with 16 MB of Ram and 64 MB of Flash memory.  A 
micro sd socket is also included.  Importantly, the Gumstix board includes provisions for 
expansion  through  two  external  connectors.   These  connectors  allow  boards  to  be 
attached to the front and back of the Gumstix board using ZIF sockets and screws with 
spacers.  Care must be taken to align the modules and the screws holding the assembly 
together.
The  prototype  Gumstix  stack  includes  the  Netstix  expansion  board,  which 
provides  an  SMC9117  ethernet  adapter  chip.   The  prototype  firmware  implements  a 
minimal number of a features for this network chip, forgoing software or hardware based 
queuing, or interrupt receive and transmit management.  Although these features would 
enhance the performance of the prototype device, they have not yet been implemented 
due to the difficulty of doing so.
A Console VX extension is also attached to the prototype device.  This extension 
provides headers for the three serial ports provided by the Xscale processor, and breakout 
pins  for  the I2C IO devices  described in  Section  2.2.   Additional  digital  IO may be 
provided  by  this  board,  if  desired.  More  information  about  the  configuration  of  the 
prototype  hardware,  including  pinouts  and  documentation  of  which  UART  port  it 
connected  where  may  be  found  in  the  Summer  2010  progress  report.   Resources 
pertaining to the Gumstix board are located in Section 6 of this document.
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Section 2.2 – IO Hardware
For IO generation, the prototype RTU uses four ICs.  These devices are connected 
to  the Inter-IC bus  of  the  Xscale.   The  I2C bus is  designed to  be  a  simple,  easy  to 
implement communication standard for local IC communications.  This bus is pulled high 
by two 4.7 kilo-ohm resistors, allowing bus contention to be automatically discovered by 
the attached devices.  If a device attempts to send a logic high, but observes a logic low 
on the bus, contention has occurred, and the contending device ceased communication. 
As a result, devices transmitting the most zeros will tend to “win” contentions.
These IO devices have been chosen for their  similarity to existing commercial 
examples of RTUs.  These include a digital IO chip, an analog input chip, and two analog 
output chips, for a total of eight digital IO, eight analog in, and two analog out.  Although 
the Gumstix board can generate its own digital IO, a digital IO IC is utilized to keep all  
external IO in the same memory space, and to isolate digital IO from the Xscale chip 
itself.  These IO chips operate at a bus speed of 400kHz.
I2C is an extremely well documented method of communicating with embedded 
devices.   Some resources to  this  effect  are  found in Section 5 of this  document.  In 
summary, a master device is attached to several slave devices.  When the master device 
wishes to communicate, it sends an I2C Start command, followed by a seven bit address, 
with a single bit indicating the direction of desired communication (read or write).  If a 
device with the given address is attached to the bus, it sends an acknowledgment. If the 
direction is read, the slave device begins transmitting data, and the master acknowledges 
the data.  If the master is done reading data, it simply ceases acknowledging incoming 
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bytes, and sends a stop command.  If the data direction is write, the master begins sending 
data, followed by an acknowledgement from the slave device.  If the slave cannot handle 
any further incoming data, it does not acknowledge.  If the master does not wish to send 
any more data, it simply sends a stop.  All transactions must terminate in a stop command 
to avoid bus contention.
Each  device  implements  different  command  sets  on  the  I2C  bus,  requiring 
different  arrangements of  reads  and writes.   The  data  sheet  for  each  component  will 
include multiple examples of interfacing with the device.
Section 2.2 – Development PC
The development PC is running the Ubuntu Linux operating system, and contains 
all the utilities required to actively write code within the OKL4 / Gumstix environment, 
as well as code versioning and debug interface software.  Although the build tools for 
OKL4 are specific to Linux, the choice of PC and Linux distribution are arbitrary.  The 
build system consists  of  a  custom GCC cross  compiler,  the  ElfWeaver  software,  and 
OKL4 SDK.  Other necessary tools include a TFTP server, and the git version tracker.
After code is compiled,  the ElfWeaver program generates a bootable ELF file. 
The prototype hardware loads code into RAM upon each system reboot by using TFTP. 
The Make files in the project automatically upload a bootable ELF file to the TFTP server 
root  directory.   The bootloader  on  the  prototype  requests  this  file,  and boots.   More 
information is provided in Section 4.
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Section 3 – The Build System
The tools required to build the firmware for the prototype RTU are available on 
the OKL4 Website  (http://www.okl4.org/). The OKL4 SDK for Xscale  and the EABI 
toolchain are required, while the OKL4 base system is helpful when trying to determine 
the  operation  of  some  base  functionality.   These  tools  must  run  under  Linux. 
Documentation is provided, with detail  on how to install and integrate with the build 
environment.  Section 3.1 will detail the specifics of the Linux environment currently 
being used, Section 3.2 will provide an overview of the GCC tool-chain used to compile 
individual  cells.  Section  3.3  discusses  the  OKL4 SDK,  and  Section  3.4  reviews  the 
Elfweaver tool, and all its caveats.
Section 3.1 – Build PC
Currently,  the  Linux  configuration  used  for  development  includes  a  base  of 
Ubuntu 10.10.  Aside from the OKL4 tools, the only necessary tools are git,  a TFTP 
server, and a serial port terminal such as minicom.  The configuration of git and the serial 
port terminal are trivial and self-evident.  The TFTP server is slightly more complicated, 
and it would be prudent to test remotely using a TFTP client located on the local network. 
Problems tend to arise in unix file permissions for the TFTP directory, and its contents. 
Currently,  permisisons  for  the  TFTP server  directory  and  all  files  therein  are  777, 
although this is traditionally bad practice.
With the build system configured in this manner, it is possible to develop code 
from any environment,  commit  this  code to  the server  using git  (see Section 5),  and 
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remotely  compile  the  code  using  this  development  machine.   Simply  rebooting  the 
prototype RTU will refresh the code loaded into RAM.  If local compilation is desired, it 
must be done under Linux.
Section 3.2 – Uboot and TFTP
The Gumstix board uses the Uboot boot loader to load code into the RAM of the 
Gumstix and begin  execution.   The bootloader  automatically  executes  a  script  which 
loads code from the custom development PC via TFTP.  In order to stop this process, 
follow the on screen instructions before boot. From the factory, this bootloader uses the 
following commands to load a Linux operating system from Flash memory:
setenv bootargs console=ttyS0,115200n8 root=1f01 rootfstype=jffs2 
reboot=cold,hard 
fsload a2000000 boot/uImage 
bootm a2000000 
Runing this code at the uboot prompt restores the factory default linux installation. 
The modified boot script loads code over TFTP. 
ipaddr = 192.168.1.77 
serveriip = 192.168.1.16 
tftpboot a2000000 image.boot 
bootelf a2000000 
The server IP is the IP address of the PC containing the boot code.  “image.boot” is the 
file name in the TFTP directory of the development PC.  If either of these things change, 
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the boot script must be changed.  This can be done from the uboot command line.
Section 3.2 – Code Organization and Compilation
Within the project source tree, there are directories for each cell.  There is also a 
central directory of libraries which can be utilized by all cells.  Under the cell directory, 
there is a central Makefile, and an XML file which determines how the cell is weaved 
with all other cells.  A “src” directory contains the “src” tree, while the “inc” directory 
includes  headers  and  includes  files.   The  “build-debug”  directory  contain  previously 
compiled source code. The exception to this rule is the “Utility” cell.
The utility cell is designed to spawn multiple child threads through ElfWeaver. 
These are compiled as a single cohesive unit, and each threads' start point is loaded at 
run-time after ElfWeaver generates the appropriate initialization code.  As a result, each 
thread has its own directory which is analogous to the “cell” subtree described above. 
The  Makefile  located  in  the  Utility  directory  handles  the  traversal  of  all  sub-tree 
directories.
Code is compiled using the GCC cross compiler.  Each cell is compiled as through 
it were completely independent from all other cells: its own independent elf is created by 
GCC and the linker.  These are weaved together with the kernel code later.  As a result,the 
make  scripts  located  throughout  the  source  tree  simply  traverse  deeper  levels  of  the 
source tree until they encounter a single cell, which is compiled singly.  The next cell is  
then similarly compiled, until all cells are compiled.
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Section 3.3 – The OKL4 SDK
The  OKL4  SDK  contains  precompiled  kernel  images  which include  different 
features of the kernel.  The prototype uses the micro-debug kernel.  This kernel includes 
provisions for a kernel debugger, which can be accessed by hidding the “Escape” key 
during operation.  All commands are accessed through a menu, which is nagivated by 
various upper and lower case alphanumeric characters.  A question mark character (“?”) 
will display all available options under the current menu tree.
All versions of the kernel use the same machine.xml.  This machine.xml is used to 
define the hardware available to the operating system.  This includes physical memory 
sections,  their  start  addresses  and  size,  and  the  available  memory  page  sizes.   The 
machine.xml  file  also  defines  all  memory  mapped  hardware,  and  their  associated 
interrupts.  These device defines allow the use of the “use_device” tag in cell-specific 
XML files.   This  simply maps the memory spaces  and interrupts  to  a  particular  cell 
without requiring any complicated configuration of memory access constraints.  The cell 
is simply granted unfettered access to the resources alloted to that device, and no  other 
cells may map the same device.  Interestingly enough, these cell's memory spaces may be 
mapped in a read-only manner to other cells, which is used in the prototype for timing 
testing.  Timing operations simply observer a free-running counter value, and calculate 
the difference in time.
Section 3.4 – ElfWeaver
The  ElfWeaver  tool  gathers  the  ELF  files  generated  during  the  compilation 
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process, and combines them with the selected kernel image, using the XML files in each 
cell's directory to generate the correct cell environment (priority, threads, heap and stack 
size, and so on).  ElfWeaver is executed immediately following the linking proceess, and 
gathers all the XML files in the directory structure (as defined by the first lines in the 
main Makefile), and begins to divvy up system resources.  These XML files must exist in 
the root directory of each cell pointed by the make file.  The ELF files for each cell may 
be located elsewhere, as is indicated by the XML file header.
There  are  dozens  of  possible  XML tags  that  may  be  used  to  configure  the 
environment  generated  for  each  cell. The  ElfWeaver  tool  performs  a  remarkably 
complicated job, essentially providing the separation and security that makes the OKL4 
operating system appealing.  This process requires a lot of CPU time, and is not enhanced 
by multiple cores.  Unfortunately, the ElfWeaver tool is a miasma of python scripts, and 
contains  quite  a  few  bugs,  ranging  from  annoying  to  critical.   Among  the  bugs 
encountered through the development  of  the  prototype RTU, two required significant 
effort to work around.
The first  bug causes secondary threads to spawn improperly.   In the prototype 
RTU, utility functionality and physical IO are combined in a single cell.  All of these 
processes operate as separate threads.  Although the OKL4 SDK includes examples of 
spawning threads from within a cell, this process is not trivial, and would require that 
capabilities be passed around through IPC, in order for remote cells to communicate with 
these run-time generated threads.  Threads which are spawned in ElfWeaver are much 
simpler  to  execute.   All  that  is  required  is  a  simple  XML tag  which  passes  the  star 
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locatoin of a thread to the ElfWeaver.  Unfortunately, this does not work properly with the 
base release of Elfweaver.  Instead, ElfWeaver simply writes the start location of these 
newly spawned threads as the same locatoin as the Idle thread.  This results in a group of 
threads which appear to do nothing.  This problem was caused by a function call in the 
ElfWeaver failing to pass the start location defined in the XML file.  The default start 
location is the location of the idle thread.  Simply adding this declaration in the functino 
call solved the bug.
The remaining bug has been far more insidious.   This bug causes a failure to 
compile if more than three cells are built in ElfWeaver.  Regardless of heap and stack 
assignments, no more than three cells will make it through the weaving process.  The 
error halts weaving, and results in no new image being generated.  This bug is located in 
the  virtual  to  physical  memory  mapping  process.   This 
file, /tools/pyelf/weaver/allocator.py , handles the segmentation of physical memory, and 
the  division  into  virtual  memory  segments.   This  segmentation  results  in  “slices”  of 
memory which do not neatly fit the page boundary.  These slices cannot be used, and are 
essentially  wasted.   For  some  reason,  excessive  waste  is  occurring,  resulting  in 
insufficient memory to support more than three cells.
Section 4 – Using GIT
GIT is a tool for managing revisions and changes to source code.  Devleoped by 
Linus Torvalds for the Linux Kernel, this tool is uniquely suited for projects with many 
disparate contributors, operating with many disparate workflows.  The basic unit of trade 
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in GIT is a change.  A change made to a file is tracked, and when this file is committed,  
the change is recorded.  A local copy of all files is always maintained.  If GIT is not 
desired, it may simply be disregarded.  For a much better explanation of GIT's usage, see 
the ProGit ebook listed in Section 6.
Section  5 – Resources
Microchip, Datasheet for MCP23009, 
http://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/en/DeviceDoc/22121b.pdf
Microchip, Datasheet for MCP4725, 
http://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/en/DeviceDoc/22039c.pdf
Analog Devices, Datasheet for AD7997, http://www.analog.com/static/imported-
files/data_sheets/AD7997_7998.pdf
Marvell/Intel, Datasheet for Xscale PXA 270, 
http://www.marvell.com/products/processors/applications/pxa_family/pxa_27x_emts.pdf
Scott Chacon, “Pro Git”, E-book, http://progit.org/book/




This appendix contains selected code samples from throughout the build system, 
including more  examples  of  XML declarations,  a  summary of  the  data  structure  and 
algorithms used in the role-based access control system, and the physical IO interfacing.
Appendix 2.1 – Utility Cell Elfweaver XML File







<thread name="serial" start="serial_main" priority="255"/> 
<thread name="i2c" start="i2c_main" priority="255"/> 
<thread name="test" start="test_main" priority="255"/>
<thread name="hwman" start="hwman_main" priority="255"/>
<memsection cache_policy="uncached" name="timer_vaddr" 
phys_addr="0x40A00000" size="0x1000" attach="r" />
<environment>





















































struct authedUser * nextUser;
} authedUser;
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return retval & 0x01;
case 0x01:
return (retval & 0x02)>>1;
case 0x02:
return (retval & 0x04)>>2;
case 0x03:
return (retval & 0x08)>>3;
case 0x04:
return (retval & 0x10)>>4;
case 0x05:
return (retval & 0x20)>>5;
case 0x06:
return (retval & 0x40)>>6;
case 0x07:





char setDigital(char selected, char state)
{




result = current & ~(1<<selected);
} else {

























return data1<<8 | data2;
}
}















Brad Luyster 1679 Trigg St.
Louisville, KY  40213
Education:
University of Louisville 2005 - 2009
Bachelor of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering.
Highest Honors. GPA 3.76
Experience:
University of Louisville:  Research Assistant   January 2010 - Present
Research  Assistant  in  the  Electrical  and  Computer  Engineering  Department's  Intelligent 
Systems Research Laboratory.  Investigated and developed methods for securing SCADA 
Remote Terminal Units using mathematically verified Microkernel operating systems on low 
power embedded processors.
University of Louisville: Information Technology     April 2006 -  Dec 2009
Assisted Students, Professors and Staff of the Computer Engineering and Computer Science 
Department in  day-to-day troubleshooting and tech support, culminating in the design and 
construction of  the Information  Technology  infrastructure for  the  Duthie  Center  for 
Engineering.
Federal Bureau of Investigation: Intern    January 2007 – August 2008
Employed for 3 semesters at the Kentucky Regional Computer Forensics lab, assisted in 
investigating  computer  crime,  as  well  as  developing  methods  to  verify  the  integrity  of 
evidence gathering software.
Awards and Publications:
“A Prototype Security Hardened Field Device for Industrial Control Systems”, International 
Conference on Advanced Computing and Communications Proceedings,  Orlando, Florida, 
September 2010.
IEEE Student Section Service Award, Spring 2010
Leadership:
Tau Beta Pi Engineering Honors Fraternity
Active member, 2007-Present.
IEEE Student Section
Served as an officer of the University of Louisville Student IEEE from 2008-2010.
99
